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As the costs and regulatory barriers to new water supply development continue to rise, 
drought management strategies have begun to rely more heavily on demand measures such as 
temporary conservation and water transfers. While these actions are effective, they often lead to 
intermittent and unpredictable reductions in revenues that are financially disruptive to water 
utilities, raising concerns over lower credit ratings and higher rates of borrowing for this capital-
intensive sector. Consequently, there has been growing interest in financial risk management 
strategies, such as index insurance. While individual index insurance contracts have been 
designed for particular water utilities, the reserves that insurers are required to maintain in order 
to ensure payouts result in high opportunity costs of capital, and thereby expensive contracts. In 
order to reduce the costs of contracts and increase the potential for widespread implementation of 
these contracts, this dissertation aims to explore the potential benefits of pooling risks through 
the development of financial index insurance that can be broadly applied across the U.S. to 
compensate water utilities for weather-related financial losses. In assessing the potential benefits 
of pooling weather-related risks, this work also addresses it challenges, such as the spatial 
autocorrelation of weather and high levels of basis risk. Chapter 2 analyzes drought-related 
financial risks for a large set of publicly operated water utilities across the country and examines 
the effectiveness of various index-insurance contracts, considering the index’s correlation with 
utility revenues and its spatial autocorrelation. Results indicate that risk pooling, even under 
 iv 
conditions in which droughts are subject to some level of spatial autocorrelation, has the 
potential to significantly reduce the insurer’s required reserves, and thereby the opportunity costs 
of maintaining them, resulting in lower contract costs for water utilities. Chapter 3 builds upon 
the findings of Chapter 2, and assesses strategies for further cost reduction measures through 
integrating PHDI-based index insurance with reinsurance purchased from a third party, which 
can reduce the net cost of risk management for utilities over both individual and multi-year 
periods. Chapter 4 addresses the challenges associated with lowering the basis risk inherent in 
broadly applicable index insurance contracts through multi-variate indices derived from decision 
tree-based models, with multiple indexes considered using different spatial and temporal 
resolutions. Index contracts developed from these tree-based models are found to substantially 
reduce basis risk, increasing the effectiveness of index insurance and making them more 
attractive to both buyers and sellers. Overall, this dissertation demonstrates the potential benefits, 
while addressing some of the primary challenges, of using financial instruments to pool 
hydrologic-related financial risks for water utilities. Results should be useful to water resource 
planners, utility personnel, and financial institutions (e.g. re/insurance firms) seeking to reduce 
the financial impacts of increased reliance on adaptive measures (e.g. conservation, transfers) to 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
 Hydrologic variability poses serious challenges to effective water supply management 
(Chapman, 2012; National Research Council, 2011; Polasek, 2014; The World Bank, 2009). 
While the maintenance of surplus supply capacity (beyond that required to meet demands under 
average conditions) has historically served as a successful hedge against drought events, the 
declining availability of new supplies, higher costs, and a more onerous environmental approval 
process have all served to reduce the pace of new source development. (FEMA, 2012; Gleick, 
2003; Ho et al., 2017; Kundzewicz et al., 2007; GWSP Digital Water Atlas, 2018). As a result, 
many water utilities have begun to rely more heavily on nonstructural alternatives, including 
various forms of demand management (i.e. conservation) and reallocation of existing supplies 
(i.e. water transfers) as a means of managing drought (Beecher and Chesnutt, 2012; Brajer et al., 
1989; Leurig, 2010; U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 1994). These approaches have often been 
effective, but can also lead to significant variability in utility costs and revenues (Donnelly and 
Christian-Smith, 2013; Hughes et al., 2014; Schmidt and Lewis, 2017; Tiger et al., 2014). These 
unpredictable variations introduce financial instability, which is difficult for utilities to manage, 
given their typical budgetary model in which prices are set to recover costs, and exacerbated by 
their financial structure in which the majority of costs are fixed (e.g., debt service) while the 
majority of revenues are linked to water sales (Donnelly and Christian-Smith, 2013; Olmstead 
and Stavins, 2009; Schmidt and Lewis, 2017; Spang et al., 2015). As such, unexpected 
reductions in water sales (from conservation) reduce revenues but do not result in commensurate 
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decreases in costs. Unexpected increases in costs due to drought management activities (e.g., 
water transfers) introduce similar challenges. Both activities can lead to budget shortfalls that can 
be difficult to mitigate, as raising prices quickly enough to compensate for lost 
revenues/increased costs is often infeasible for these heavily regulated public sector 
organizations (Hughes et al., 2014; Olmstead and Stavins, 2009; Tiger et al., 2014). In terms of 
impact, financial instability can lead to a host of challenges, not least of which is a credit rating 
downgrade, which can significantly increase borrowing rates (Chapman, 2017; Donnelly and 
Christian-Smith, 2013; Polasek, 2014). For a capital-intensive sector like the water utility 
industry, in which the majority of costs typically come in the form of debt service payments, 
credit downgrades can present significant and long-term financial challenges for water utilities 
(Hughes et al., 2014; Leurig, 2012).   
 Mitigating the financial consequences of hydrologic variability can be accomplished via a 
number of approaches including drought surcharges, changes in pricing regime (e.g., fraction of 
fixed vs. volumetric) (Schmidt and Lewis, 2017; Spang et al., 2015), and the maintenance of 
reserve funds (Donnelly and Christian-Smith, 2013). Additionally, recent studies have found that 
financial instruments may also have significant potential in mitigating these financial 
consequences (Zeff et al., 2014; Zeff and Characklis, 2013). Instruments such as index insurance 
that provide financial payouts under water scarce conditions are one example. In this case, the 
payout amount is linked to specified thresholds measured by an index composed of one or more 
metrics (e.g. precipitation) rather than a direct assessment of damages. In order to be effective, 
the index must exhibit a high correlation with financial losses, a situation in which the contracts 
are characterized as having low “basis risk”. Examples include index insurance based on the 
strong correlation between deviations from expected temperatures and revenues in the electric 
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power industry (where the majority of demand comes from heating/cooling of buildings) and 
dryland agriculture where precipitation and crop yields can be closely linked (Cao and Wei, 
2004; Fuchs and Wolff, 2011; Müller and Grandi, 2000; Stoppa and Hess, 2003; Turvey, 2001; 
Varangis et al., 2001).  
 Financial contracts have been explored in the literature as a means of transferring the 
financial risk of drought from an individual water utility to a third-party insurer (i.e. risk shifting) 
(Brown and Carriquiry, 2007; Zeff and Characklis, 2013; Zeff et al., 2014) using contracts based 
on indices carefully constructed for an individual utility’s circumstances. However, these indices 
can be time consuming and expensive to develop, limiting the commercial viability of 
developing indices tailored to many individual utilitity’s circumstances. Moreover, 
individualized contracts can result in the insurer having to maintain higher reserves in order to be 
able to ensure payouts under extreme conditions. The opportunity costs of maintaining these 
reserves in a liquid (i.e. rapidly accessible) form, in which lower returns are earned, can be quite 
high.  
 To reduce the opportunity costs of capital and encourage broader adoption of a financial 
instrument, risk pooling via a generalized form of index-based contracts may have significant 
potential. Risk pooling involves the sharing of uncorrelated, or mostly uncorrelated, risks, which 
reduces the probability of all the insured parties experiencing a loss at the same time, thereby 
reducing the capital reserves needed to make payouts to those parties with a specified level of 
confidence. As more parties join the risk pool, the average losses for the pool converge to the 
expected losses (Law of Large Numbers) and the variance of the average of pooled losses 
decreases (Central Limit Theorem) (Smith and Kane, 1994). This translates into lower 
opportunity costs of maintaining reserves and thereby lowers the costs of insurance for each pool 
 4 
 
member. However, weather events, such as drought, are spatially autocorrelated (non-
independent), potentially reducing the effectiveness of risk pooling relative to an ideal scenario 
(uncorrelated risks), but the degree to which this occurs is still undetermined.  
This dissertation assesses the potential advantages of pooling drought-related financial 
risks across the U.S. through hydrologic-based index insurance. The objectives are to better 
understand the challenges, such as the spatial autocorrelation of drought, and high levels of basis 
risk, while also developing various insurance contract designs that could lead to more effective 
financial insurance for protecting water utilities from drought-related losses. Chapter two 
(recently published in Water Resources Research (Baum et al., 2018)), examines the potential of 
various indices to serve as a basis for contracts, and then analyzes the spatial autocorrelation of 
these indices to describe the benefits of risk pooling, as measured by the reduction in reserve 
requirements and consequent lowering of  the opportunity costs of capital that can lead to lower 
insurance prices. This analysis focuses on a group of 315 utilities, for which a unique set of 
financial data was available. This work then uses these utilities to quantify the reduction in costs 
of managing financial risks of droughts via risk pooling, relative to a situation in which a utility 
would engage with an insurer in a single contract (risk shifting) or seek to self-insure by 
maintaining sufficient reserves of its own. Results suggest that risk pooling has the potential to 
significantly lower required reserve levels and reduce the contract costs, however there are still 
extreme (low probability, high consequence) events to which these utilities are exposed that 
contribute to driving reserve requirements significantly higher than they would otherwise be. 
Chapter 3 addresses the financial challenges that these extreme risks pose for risk pools 
and analyzes strategies for reducing risk management costs through the additional use of risk 
shifting approaches via reinsurance contracts (in review in Journal of Water Resources Planning 
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and Management). Reinsurance involves the transfer of specified risks from an insurer or mutual 
(essentially an insurance firm owned and operated by the insured parties) to a reinsurer that 
typically uses diversification across a portfolio of large but uncorrelated risks, to reduce the 
required reserves needed to compensate its counterparties (e.g., insurance firms or mutual), 
taking advantage of its lower costs of capital to assume risks for lower cost than the 
counterparties themselves (Schanz et al., 2010; Scordis and Steinorth, 2012). This analysis 
assesses the advantages of reinsurance in reducing capital costs, when layered with risk pooling, 
and describes how a combination of risk pooling and risk shifting can further reduce the costs of 
achieving an equivalent level of financial protection for a national-scale pool (i.e. mutual) of 
water utilities over both individual and multi-year periods. 
While each member of a risk pool benefits from the lower costs of managing risk via a 
combination of pooling and shifting, each is also ultimately responsible for its own financial 
stability. Therefore, each pool member (i.e. water utility) will be concerned with how effective 
index insurance, or any financial instrument, is in reducing its own financial risks. A water utility 
will only find a financial instrument to be attractive if it provides adequate protection at a 
reasonable price and exhibits low basis risk. Compared to an individualized contract, the basis 
risk associated with the generalized contract is likely to be greater. In order to reduce the basis 
risk of the generalized contracts developed for risk pooling applications, Chapter 4 develops a 
generalized decision tree-based model in which multi-variate indices are used to determine 
payouts. While many existing parametric contracts are based on a single index, this work aims to 
use multivariate indices to better account for the individual circumstances of different water 
utilities that may complicate the correlation between any one index and utility revenues. This 
structure allows for a more complex, yet still transparent and generalizable approach, to 
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identifying contract structures with lower basis risk, one that should be easily scalable to a 
national level. Lowering basis risk in this way increases the probability of each water utility 
receiving an appropriate payout when experiencing hydrologic-related losses, increasing the 
likelihood of more utilities participating in the risk pool.  
Hydrologic variability is predicted to increase in the future (National Drought Mitigation 
Center, 2016), and combining this with projections of increased water demand and growing 
barriers to new supply development, suggests new approaches will be required to promote 
financially stable water utilities. Given the negative effects of low revenue years, and the 
increasing rate of credit ratings downgrades among utilities (Donnelly and Christian-Smith, 
2013), it is clear that water utilities face long-term financial challenges as a result of hydrologic 
variability. This dissertation develops novel financial instruments and more sophisticated risk 
management strategies for water utilities that are vulnerable to weather-related financial losses. 
Given the success of other economic sectors in using financial instruments to reduce weather-
related losses and the potential to create less expensive financial instruments with low basis risk, 
there is great potential for widespread scalability of improved financial risk management for 
water utilities via risk pooling. Improved strategies could benefit thousands of water utilities, 
providing them with greater financial stability, and ultimately lower prices to utility customers 
over the long-term. The tools and strategies developed in this work may also bring insights that 
can be applied more broadly to other economic sectors facing weather-based financial volatility 
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CHAPTER 2: EFECTS OF GEOGRAPHIC DIVERSIFICATION ON RISK POOLING 




Many regions across the United States face increasing vulnerability to drought due to 
growing demands and constraints on supply development (e.g. reduced availability, 
environmental permitting), with an average of 9% of the country experiencing severe drought at 
any given time since 2000 (National Drought Mitigation Center, 2016). The challenges 
associated with expanding and/or maintaining large supply capacities as a hedge against drought 
events have led many utilities to rely more heavily on non-structural alternatives to manage 
drought, such as temporary conservation measures (Leurig, 2010; Brajer et al., 1989; Alliance 
for Water Efficiency, 2012). While this alternative has proven effective for ensuring a high level 
of reliability (Alliance for Water Efficiency, 2012), it introduces financial instability in the form 
of lower revenues that can make temporary conservation measures less attractive to utility 
managers. 
Water utility finances are structured in such a way that short-term costs are mostly fixed 
(~80-95%), much of this due to debt service payments on infrastructure, while most revenues 
(~80-90%) are generated via volumetric water sales (Hughes et al., 2014; Hanemann, 1997). 
However, in the long-term, costs are variable as the system depreciates and capacities change 
                                               
1	Published in Water Resources Research. Baum, R., Characklis, G. W., and Serre, M. L. (2018). Effects of 
geographic diversification on risk pooling to mitigate drought-related financial losses for water utilities. Water 
Resources Research, 54(4), 2561-2579. https:// doi.org/10.1002/2017WR021468  
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(Hanemann, 1997). This work is focused on management of short-term variability in revenues 
due to drought, which leads to unpredictable reductions in usage, as a result of drought-related 
conservation measures. This disrupts a utility’s traditional cost recovery budgetary model, 
wherein prices are set such that revenues are expected to equal costs at the end of each budgeting 
period, typically annually (Hughes et al., 2014; Tiger et al., 2014).  Disruptions are difficult to 
remedy in the short-run as prices for publicly operated utilities cannot be quickly or easily 
modified. Across the U.S., water utility financial health, as measured by metrics such as debt 
service coverage ratio (revenues divided by debt service obligations), has been declining, as 
greater reliance on demand management has resulted in an increased frequency of lower revenue 
periods (Alliance for Water Efficiency, 2014). Given that raising prices to compensate for lower 
revenues can be politically difficult (Olmstead and Stavins, 2009), even a five percent reduction 
in revenue can be challenging to manage (Zeff et al., 2014). Water utilities are also concerned by 
events that reflect poorly in their financial metrics, as this can lead to credit downgrades. A credit 
downgrade can significantly increase the rate at which a utility borrows, a critically important 
factor in this capital intensive sector where debt-service costs can account for up to 50% of a 
utility’s total costs (Hughes et al., 2014). These pressures have contributed to a situation in which 
5% of the rated utilities across the country received credit rating downgrades in 2016 (Chapman 
et al., 2017).  
In order to avoid budget shortfalls and credit downgrades, some water utilities are 
shifting away from volumetric pricing toward higher fixed charges in order to stabilize their 
revenue stream. However, this reduces consumers’ incentives to conserve, further exacerbating 
short-term water scarcity concerns from drought events and contributing to the long-term 
challenges of meeting demand (Tiger et al., 2014). While price will always be a significant tool 
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for promoting financial stability, alternative strategies to maintain utility financial stability are 
also being explored. 
Beyond changing prices, utilities have several alternatives for achieving greater financial 
stability during times of severe drought, each with strengths and weaknesses. Drought surcharges 
can compensate for fluctuations in revenues and costs, but are often unpopular with consumers 
who are typically already being asked to conserve. Furthermore, inelastic urban water demand 
often means that these surcharges must be substantial in order to achieve the desired level of 
conservation (Tiger, 2009; Zeff and Characklis, 2013). Contingency, or “rate stabilization”, 
funds can act as a form of self-insurance with a utility contributing regularly to such a reserve 
and drawing on it during times of severe drought. However, the size of this reserve and the 
opportunity costs of maintaining it (e.g. low returns on liquid reserves) can grow quite large if 
the utility seeks to protect itself against more extreme events, and even larger if used to protect 
against a multi-year drought, or several droughts over a small span of years. Additionally, 
utilities associated with city government may also have difficulty maintaining such a reserve, as 
it would be an attractive target for other community spending priorities (Tiger, 2009; Eskaf et al., 
2014).   
Given the challenges in existing solutions to protect utilities from revenue variability due 
to drought and the growing need for solutions that align with temporary actions, such as 
conservation, another alternative solution has recently been proposed, one that has been used in 
many other contexts, but is relatively new to water utilities, that of financial insurance. Financial 
insurance contracts, often in the form of index insurance, have been developed to mitigate 
environmental financial risks in a number of other contexts. These include contracts designed to 
protect against financial losses associated with extreme temperatures (Müller and Grandi, 2000; 
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Cao and Wei, 2004), low rainfall (Turvey, 2001; Varangis et al., 2001; Procom et al., 2003; 
Martin et al., 2001; Fuchs and Wolff, 2011), and low streamflow (Foster et al., 2015; Meyer et 
al., 2015), with application in the electric utility, agriculture, and hydropower sectors, among 
others. The success of these index insurance contracts in other contexts, coupled with the 
increased need for new solutions to deal with increasingly volatile weather, has increased the 
motivation for creating financial instruments (Alliance for Water Efficiency, 2014; Eskaf et al., 
2104; Chesnutt et al., 2014).   
 This research explores financial contracts that would provide water utilities with a 
payout when pre-specified drought conditions prevail (Brown and Carriquiry, 2007; Zeff and 
Characklis, 2013). These financial contracts transfer some of the financial risk of drought events 
to a third party or mutual in exchange for some form of payment (i.e. premium). The third party 
might be a large financial institution, capable of either taking on the risk exposure of the 
individual utility (risk shifting), or seeking to organize and manage a pool of similar (presumably 
spatially uncorrelated) risks. Alternatively, a group of utilities with similar risks could self-
assemble to pool risks through some form of mutual. The advantages of pooling uncorrelated 
risks via either approach (third party or mutual) can lead to lower risk management costs as they 
reduce the size of required reserves relative to either self-insurance (e.g. contingency fund) or 
risk shifting to a third party on an individual basis, and thereby lower opportunity costs of 
maintaining large liquid reserves (i.e. those that can be accessed easily at any time). For all of 
these insurance approaches, the premium paid for the insured party is computed based on the 
expected payout to the covered party (i.e. utility) plus an additional “loading”, which accounts 
for administrative costs, third party returns, and the opportunity cost of reserves.  
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As an insurance tool for water utilities, third party indexed contracts have shown some 
promise, particularly as part of an integrated financial risk management strategy (Zeff and 
Characklis, 2013, Zeff et al., 2014). Zeff et al. found that index-based financial contracts have a 
critical role to play in optimal financial risk management portfolios (which also include 
restrictions, transfers, and contingency funds), being a necessary part of the portfolio in order to 
carry out the operational goals and maintain financial stability of the utility. Thus far, however, 
these contracts have been designed for the relatively specialized circumstances of a single utility 
and developing a utility-specific index requires considerable time and localized information to 
develop, raising costs and limiting the potential for widespread implementation (Zeff and 
Characklis, 2013; Zeff et al., 2014; Zeff et al., 2016). A more generalized form of index 
insurance contracts, one linked to a broadly available metric, would facilitate the pooling of risks 
across many utilities, lowering both transaction costs and the price of the contracts (Wang and 
Zhang, 2003).  
In its purest sense, risk pooling involves parties with similar, but independent, risks (e.g. 
automobile collisions) contributing to a collective fund from which each affected party can draw 
when it experiences a loss. The independence of the risks makes the probability of all, or even 
most, of the insured parties experiencing a loss at the same time very low. As the number of 
individuals in the pool increases, the average losses experienced by the entire pool tend to 
converge to the expected value (Law of Large Numbers) (Smith and Kane, 1994). This 
predictability means that payments into the reserves (i.e. premiums) can be closer to the level of 
expected payouts, thereby covering most losses on a “pay-as-you-go” basis and reducing the 
need for the insurer to maintain large reserves and lowering the associated opportunity costs. 
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This, in turn, should reduce the loading that an insurer (third party or mutual) would charge and 
thus the price of the associated contract.  
A key contributor to effective risk pooling is the degree of independence in the covered 
risks. Hydrologic events (i.e. drought) often exhibit some degree of spatial autocorrelation over 
significant distances, so risk pooling has often been perceived as having less potential to be 
effective. However, agricultural researchers have examined the potential benefits of risk pooling 
in the case of drought impacts on crop yields across large geographic areas under various degrees 
of spatial autocorrelation (i.e. not entirely independent risks), finding that it can still be quite 
effective in reducing the costs of crop insurance (Wang and Zhang, 2003; Okhrin et al., 2013; 
Woodward and Garcia, 2008).  
Based upon risk pooling theory and previous work on spatial autocorrelation for weather-
related events, risk pooling may provide significant advantages in mitigating drought-related 
financial risks for utilities, despite some level of spatial autocorrelation (non-i.i.d.). This work 
represents a practical deviation from traditional risk pooling, but one that has been confirmed for 
index-insurance for crops (Wang and Zhang, 2003; Okhrin et al., 2013; Woodward and Garcia, 
2008).  
This work aims to develop and test the performance of index-based financial instruments 
that can be pooled across a broad set of urban water utilities distributed throughout the U.S. As 
such, it contributes an analysis of the potential for risk pooling, a contrast to previous efforts to 
characterize the financial risks of drought events, which have typically revolved around 
individual utilities or a single water supply (Zeff and Characklis, 2013; Zeff et al., 2014; Zeff et 
al., 2016; Brown and Carriquiry, 2007). To do this, the relationships between several hydrologic 
indices and water utility finances (i.e. revenues) are characterized in order to better understand 
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how well the two are correlated. Once an index has been chosen as the basis for the insurance 
contracts, the potential effectiveness of risk pooling via these contracts is evaluated by assessing 
the spatial covariance characterizing the autocorrelation of the index across a set of 
geographically distributed utilities for which a unique dataset involving both hydrologic index 
values and utility revenue data has been assembled. The performance of the index-based 
financial contracts is then tested over a subset of the utilities most financially vulnerable to 
drought in order to determine the effectiveness of risk pooling. This work contributes a new 
generalized index-based insurance tool that can be applied to hundreds of water utilities across 
the U.S. to help mitigate financial losses from severe drought events and an understanding of the 
potential benefits of risk pooling across risks that are not spatially independent nor entirely 
identically distributed. These results should be of interest to water utilities, financial institutions, 
community planners, and other groups seeking to improve water supply management for urban 
utilities that are increasingly being asked to ensure high reliability without expanding supply, and 
must therefore deal with the resulting financial consequences.  
 
2.2 METHODS 
In order to create an index-based financial insurance contract, first an effective index 
must be identified. Relative to earlier work (Zeff and Characklis, 2013), the emphasis will not be 
on developing a specialized index with application to a particular utility’s individual 
circumstances, but instead to investigate more generalizable indices broadly applicable across the 
country. While this is likely to lead to lower levels of correlation between the index and revenues 
(i.e. higher basis risk), the availability and transparency of a more traditional metric should ease 
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the development and management of contracts, presumably leading to lower prices for, and 
wider adoption by, consumers.   
An index-based insurance contract functions by triggering a payout under conditions 
specified by an agreed upon metric (or metrics) (Figure 1). This payout begins once the strike 
value (k) of the index is crossed, with payouts scaled (linearly, in this example) to increase as the 
absolute difference between the strike level and the index value (v) increases, as dictated by the 
slope (m), as described by: 
 
  !"#$%& = ( ∗*+,[(/ − 1), 0]       (1) 
 
In Figure 1, for example, if the index value is measured at 1.5 on the maturity date of the 
contract, the payout to the contract buyer would be approximately 4.4. The price the buyer pays 
the seller is linked to an actuarial analysis that estimates the distribution of payouts during the 
period over which the contract is in force, with the contract price then established on the basis of 
a combination of expected payouts plus a loading factor. 
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 Weather derivatives often take on the form of index-based contracts, including those 
based on heating or cooling degree-days (HDD/CDD), rainfall, and snowfall, all of which have 
been traded on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange (Cabrera et al., 2013; CME Group, 2009). The 
fact that there already exists a market for publicly traded weather-based financial hedging 
instruments, particularly in the electric utility sector (HDD/CDD), and that credit rating agencies 
lament the lack of a similar instrument in the water utility sector, suggests that a similar weather-
based index could be suitable in the water utility sector (CME Group, 2011; Chapman and 
Breeding, 2016; Alliance for Water Efficiency, 2014; Chestnutt et al., 2014).  
Several hydrologic indices are analyzed in order to characterize their correlation with 
water utility operating revenue. Once the index is selected, its spatial autocorrelation is 
quantified using a covariance model, which quantifies how the index is correlated with itself 
across geographic locations (i.e. autocorrelation). The degree of spatial autocorrelation will 
impact the probability of many insured parties receiving payouts during a single period, a 
scenario of substantial interest to insurers as it impacts the size of the reserves they must 
maintain, thereby increasing their costs. Generally, the spatial autocorrelation is high when two 
locations are nearby to one another and decreases as the distance (i.e. spatial lag) increases. The 
covariance model characterizes the relationship between decreasing spatial autocorrelation and 
increasing spatial lag. The distance over which the covariance decreases to a low level (usually 
set to 5% of the variance) is called the covariance spatial range, and is a critical parameter 
affecting the effectiveness of risk pooling.  
The spatial covariance of the index is assessed across the set of utilities for which 
revenue data, often a limiting factor, is available (ideally, financial data would be available for 
all utilities across the US, but this is not presently the case). Once the covariance of the 
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hydrologic index is determined, a generalized index insurance contract is developed and further 
analysis is performed to assess the effectiveness of risk pooling across the set of utilities. The 
total risk exhibited by the pool of contracts is then evaluated with attention to the one-year 
99.5% value at risk (VaR), a measure of the risk of very high payouts in any individual period (in 
this case one year), and a threshold level often used by regulators to determine reserve size 
requirements for insurers (American Academy of Actuaries, 2015; IAIS, 2017). The 99.5% VaR 
can be determined using historical or synthetic data in which it is the value corresponding to the 
lowest 0.5% of data. For example, if a dataset with 1,000 trials was assessed, the 99.5% VaR 
would be the 5th lowest value. This value would reflect the most that the company could expect 
to lose, with 99.5% confidence in a one-year period.   
For events in which the payouts to the insured parties exhibit a long covariance range (i.e.  
spatial autocorrelation over long distances), such as to homeowners in South Florida when a 
hurricane strikes, the total reserves an insurer must maintain, relative to expected payouts, are 
significantly greater than the reserves an insurer would need to maintain for payouts that would 
occur for more independent events that exhibit very short covariance ranges and a lack of spatial 
autocorrelation (e.g. automobile collisions). For events exhibiting lower spatial autocorrelation, 
the distribution of aggregate payouts displays a lower variance about the expected value, leading 
to a lower 99.5% VaR, reducing the reserves an insurer must maintain (Figure 2).  
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Figure 2. Illustrative example of the effects of covariance on VaR: When spatial autocorrelation 
increases (i.e. the level of independence decreases), the VaR increases 
 
This analysis aims to explore the effects of risk pooling under conditions in which the 
insured risks have differing degrees of spatial autocorrelation. The drought-related financial risks 
experienced by the utilities exhibit some level of spatial autocorrelation, and consequently, so 
will the payouts an insurer would make on a pool of contracts indexed to a drought metric. This 
analysis makes use of a unique data set that includes coincident financial and hydrologic 
information from 315 publicly operated surface water utilities spanning 68 NOAA climate 
divisions across the U.S., (from Alabama, California, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Michigan, 
North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Washington and 
Wisconsin) all of which had at least eight years of coincident financial and hydrologic data 
























































Figure 3. Locations for the 315 utilities used in this study (divisions indicate NOAA climate 
division boundaries) 
 
All 315 utilities are publicly operated water utilities, meaning that they are non-profit 
entities led by elected and appointed public officials. Because of this, raising rates on short 
notice and/or maintaining large reserves of unallocated funds, can be very difficult (Alliance for 
Water Efficiency, 2014). This work focuses exclusively on utilities drawing on surface water 




2.2.1 Identifying an effective index 
To create an index-based financial contract, it is necessary to characterize the relationship 
between hydrologic behavior and the related financial risk. Candidate hydrologic indices could 
include precipitation, streamflow, reservoir storage, and drought indices (e.g. Palmer drought 
indices) either as singular measurements or as cumulative values that accrue over a defined 
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period. An effective index should be transparent, publicly available, not easily manipulated, and 
strongly correlated with the financial metric(s) of interest. Most systems dependent on surface 
water include some form of reservoir storage, so low reservoir levels may be an obvious signal 
of drought (and the need to conserve water). However, reservoir levels can be impacted by the 
actions of the utilities themselves, making them open to concerns over manipulation or moral 
hazard and thus less suitable. Other candidate indices, such as precipitation, streamflow, and 
drought indices, are transparent, involve publicly available data and act as reasonable proxies for 
drought. The question then becomes how well these indices correlate with utility financial risk. 
In this work, financial risk is measured in terms of the reductions in utility operating revenue, 
often a result of reduced water sales that in many cases can be linked to drought-related 
restrictions on water use. Since short-term utility costs are mostly fixed, large and unexpected 
reductions in operating revenue can introduce a substantial financial risk to water systems 
(Hughes and Leurig, 2013; Hanemann, 1997; Omlstead and Stavins, 2009).  
The degree to which the index and financial risk are uncorrelated is typically termed 
“basis risk”; If basis risk is high, then payouts will not match up well with financial losses and 
vice versa, leaving the insured party (i.e. the water utility) with more risk exposure than they 
expect, as well as the potential for payouts when no (or few) losses occur. The insurer, on the 
other hand, will make decisions regarding contract prices and payouts based upon the behavior 
of the index itself, which is often well characterized and so is less concerned with the timing of 
payouts to individual utilities as long as the total payouts are in line with the insurer’s estimates. 
Earlier research focused on very detailed indices constructed to suit the circumstances of 
individual water utilities (Zeff and Characklis, 2013; Zeff et al., 2014; Zeff et al., 2016). These 
indices are typically highly correlated with water utility revenues (i.e. low basis risk) but would 
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be difficult to implement broadly, given the data required to evaluate hydrologic conditions at 
each utility. One objective of this work is to explore the performance of alternative indices which 
will be more broadly applicable, even if they exhibit somewhat higher basis risk than an index 
tailored to each individual utility.  
 
2.2.2 Hydrologic indices and correlation with operating revenue 
Precipitation, streamflow, and the Palmer Hydrologic Drought Index (PHDI) were tested 
to determine the strength of their correlation with operating revenues across the set of utilities 
considered. Implicit in this analysis is the assumption that nearly all utilities respond to drought 
by imposing water use restrictions. While each utility’s unique pricing scheme (e.g. fraction of 
fixed vs. volumetric charges, seasonal rates, end-use tariffs, etc.) will influence each utility’s 
relationship between drought and reduced revenues, a general link between the two has been 
well documented (Chapman and Breeding, 2016; Chesnutt et al., 2014; Eskaf et al., 2014; 
Alliance for Water Efficiency, 2014; Hughes and Leurig, 2013). Each of the three hydrologic 
variables investigated has datasets of historic observations publicly available from either the 
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) (NOAA Climatic Data Center, 
2017) or the United States Geological Survey (USGS) (USGS Water Webserver Team, 2016). 
Precipitation and streamflow data are available on a daily timestep while drought index values 
are available monthly. Utility revenue data, at least over the spatial and temporal scales required, 
were obtained from Moody’s Water and Sewer Municipal Financial Ratio Analysis (Moody’s) 
(Moody’s Analytics, 2017), but were only available at an annual timestep. The coarser 
discretization of the revenue data led to assessing correlations between candidate indices and 
revenues annually. Differences in the beginning and end of the annual revenue reporting cycle 
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for individual utilities presents some challenges, but for the purposes of this work, an assumption 
is made that all revenue totals correspond to the calendar year (January to December). 
While precipitation and streamflow measurements are straightforward, the PHDI assesses 
deviations in moisture from normal conditions based on a water balance equation that considers 
precipitation, evapotranspiration, soil moisture loss, recharge, and runoff in order to determine 
when droughts begin and end (Palmer, 1965). These PHDI values are normalized on a scale from 
-12 (indicating severe drought) to +12 (indicating extreme wetness) in order to compare drought 
levels across the United States. PHDI monthly data were obtained from NOAA (NOAA Climatic 
Data Center, 2017) at each of the 68 climate divisions in which the studied utilities were located 
over the 120-year period of record from January 1896 to December 2015. Each utility was 
assigned the PHDI value for the climate division in which it resided. The average PHDI for each 
year (January to December) was determined for each water utility. Since PHDI is based on a 
normalized scale, these values were used. It should be noted that utility revenues can also decline 
with extreme wetness, as customers may not purchase as much water for outdoor use (Tiger et 
al., 2014; Hughes et al., 2014). As revenue reductions during wet weather are not the focus of the 
current analysis, average annual PHDI values greater than +3 (indicating very wet conditions) 
were removed, as these higher PHDI values would otherwise confound the correlation between 
PHDI and reduced revenue (Table 1). The financial effects of very wet weather may be 






Table 1. Data characteristics for each tested index 
Index Location Timestep  Adjustment 
PHDI Climate division  Average annual 
(from monthly) 
Removed all PHDI values 





Removed all values above 1 
standard deviation 




Removed all values above 1 
standard deviation 
 
Total monthly precipitation data were retrieved from NOAA’s Annual Climatological 
Summary (NOAA Climatic Data Center, 2017). Additionally, a list of all precipitation gauge 
sites and their locations were obtained and then mapped with the utility locations to determine 
the three nearest gauges to each utility. Three gauges were used to smooth any inconsistencies in 
data from a single gauge. The three nearest sites were determined via ArcGIS10.1, and each 
assessed to ensure that monthly data were available from 2003-2012 (the period over which 
revenue data were also available). Average precipitation in each year was determined for each 
precipitation gauge nearest to each water utility (Table 1).  
Streamflow data were obtained from USGS in the form of average daily mean 
streamflow discharge (USGS Code 00060) over a monthly period (USGS Water Webserver 
Team, 2016). The nearest upstream sites were determined via ArcGIS10.1 through mapping all 
the streamflow sites to find the nearest gauges and then ensuring they were upstream based on 
USGS streamflow station codes, which are numbered such that on any tributary, upstream site 
numbers are lower than those downstream (USGS Annual Water Data Report, 2017). The 
nearest upstream gauge with streamflow data from 2003-2012 was used. Average daily mean 
streamflow for each year (January to December) was determined from monthly values. As with 
PHDI, correlations between utility revenues and hydrologic conditions are limited to normal and 
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dry conditions (excluding wet conditions), so streamflow values greater than 1 standard 
deviation above the mean were removed for this analysis (Table 1). 
Revenue time series data are detrended to account for increases in population and 
aggregate demand, assuming linear growth. For each utility, detrended revenues are analyzed 
with respect to their correlation with the candidate indices. Coincident time series of detrended 
revenues and candidate indices are then jointly assessed in terms of Pearson correlation values to 
determine the strength of the correlation between them.  
The correlation between operating revenues and hydrologic indices evaluated in the same 
year are somewhat low (Table 2). However, there can often be a significant lag between the time 
when conservation measures are imposed and when revenues decline, so correlations between 
utility revenues and hydrologic indices are also evaluated with the index value lagged by 1 year 
(Table 2). This lagged correlation is substantially higher, likely due to many factors, including 
utility billing practices and the timing of conservation measures. While most utilities bill their 
customers monthly, very few read meters that often. Rather, most read them on a bimonthly or 
quarterly basis, using the previous year’s consumption for the same period (or an average of 
previous years) as a proxy for the unmeasured period, which is used for billing until the meter is 
read somewhat later, at which time the bill is reconciled with actual usage. In addition, the low 
point for most surface water supplies (i.e., when conservation measures are imposed) comes in 
the late summer/early fall, following the primary irrigation season, a time which also coincides 
with the end of the fiscal year (30 September). These two factors, or in many cases the 
combination of both, lead to the financial impacts of conservation often being felt primarily in 
the following fiscal year. 
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(R > 0.5) 
Medium 
Correlation 
(0.25 < R < 0.5) 
Low 
Correlation 
(0 < R < 0.25) 
PHDI 3% 5% 11% 
Precipitation 3% 5% 16% 
Streamflow 5% 8% 15% 
    
PHDI (1-year lag) 17% 19% 30% 
Precipitation (1-year lag) 7% 9% 19% 
Streamflow (1-year lag) 13% 15% 17% 
    Note: percentages do not sum to 100% as some utilities exhibited negative correlation between  
    the index and revenues  
 
When assessing the performance of the index insurance contracts, water utilities were 
separated into three different groups, indicating different levels of correlation between the 
hydrologic variable and operating revenue, with the strength of the correlation corresponding 
roughly to the utility’s drought-related financial risk. In this work, a distinction is made between 
utilities in which Pearson correlation between the index and revenues is greater than 0.5 (high 
risk), between 0.25 and 0.5 (medium risk), and less than 0.25 (low risk). These groupings also 
indicate the level of basis risk inherent in an insurance contract based on a given index, with high 
correlations (>0.5) suggesting a more effective index on which a contract might be based. Thus, 
those utilities with a high correlation between revenues and the index will be both more at risk of 
drought related losses, and more likely to find the index-based contracts effective in insuring 
against this risk.   
Precipitation was poorly correlated with utility revenues, both with and without a one-
year lag, and was discarded as an ineffective index. The PHDI index with a one-year lag was 
most strongly linked with declining utility revenues, with 17% exhibiting a correlation greater 
than 0.5. However, the spatial resolution of PHDI is less highly resolved than that of streamflow. 
There are 344 climate divisions across the U.S., compared to 25,619 streamflow gauges. PHDI 
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values, publicly available through NOAA, are available at a climate division level (see Figure 1) 
while streamflow values are available at a finer scale, closer to the exact location of each water 
utility. Since streamflow had similarly strong correlations to water utility revenues, and is also 
transparent and not easily manipulated, and seemed likely to also be intuitive to both insurers and 
utilities (a potentially important marketing consideration), financial contracts based on both 
PHDI and streamflow are developed in this work.  
Findings indicate that 45% of the utilities analyzed have revenues that exhibit some level 
of correlation (greater than zero) with annual average daily streamflow lagged by one year and 
66% of utilities have revenues that correlate to some level with a one year lag in annual average 
PHDI. For streamflow and PHDI, 13% and 17% of utilities, respectively, have a correlation 
coefficient greater than 0.5, indicating high financial vulnerability to drought, as well as the 
potential for relatively effective insurance via an index-based contract. These correlation levels 
are consistent with levels exhibited by many hedging instruments currently in use. Publicly 
traded and broadly employed weather-based hedging contracts often have R2 values ranging 
from 0.9 to 0.2 (Manfredo and Richards, 2005; Norton et al., 2010). While contracts based on 
streamflow and PHDI may not be suitable for every utility, this analysis suggests that they have 
the potential to be useful to a significant fraction of the 15,000 surface water dependent utilities 
in the United States.  
 
2.2.3 Sharing risk through spatial diversification  
From the perspective of the insurer, there is less concern over the level of basis risk for an 
indexed product, except as this might act to reduce the attractiveness of the contract to potential 
buyers. The insurer is primarily concerned with the predictability of the payouts (which are 
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linked to the index) and the size of the reserves that must be maintained in order to meet 
regulatory standards designed to ensure solvency. To the insurer, the effectiveness of risk 
pooling is important, and is integrally linked to the degree of independence of the insured risks, 
which in this case is directly related to the degree of spatial autocorrelation associated with the 
index.  
While the specific levels of covariance in the PHDI and streamflow indices between each 
pair of insured locations (i.e. insured utilities) must be understood in order to assess the impacts 
of risk pooling (see next section), a general assessment of spatial covariance provides some 
broader insights. Therefore, a spatial covariance model was developed for: (a) the 143 
streamflow gauges and (b) the 245 PHDI climate division centroids, with these representing the 
hydrologic conditions for the subset of utilities with index/revenue correlation values greater 
than zero. Tobler’s first law of geography, that near things are more related than distant things, 
suggests that as distance increases, covariance should decrease. This analysis indicates that 
covariance in streamflow values decreases exponentially as a function of distance with 
covariance nearing zero when there is approximately 1,000 kilometers between streamflow 
gauges, with similar findings for PHDI (Figure 4). Given the spatial scale considered here (the 
entire U.S.), these results suggest that there should be significant benefits from pooling the risks 
of the utilities considered in this study.  
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Figure 4. Covariance of streamflow (top) and PHDI (bottom) values corresponding to 143 
(streamflow) and 245 (PHDI) utilities that exhibit some correlation (>0) between the index and 
revenues;  
 
Note that this spatial covariance model does not suggest that each utility must be 1,000 
km away from another in order to experience independent conditions, but rather that this is the 
farthest distance between any two utilities in the analyzed set to have a covariance near zero. It is 
also important to note that risk pooling can be effective even if some degree of spatial 
autocorrelation exists between the exposed parties, with the impact of risk pooling related to the 
rate at which covariance decays with distance (i.e. the slope in Figure 4). A similar situation 
exists when an investor limits her risk by assembling a portfolio of assets with some low level of 
correlation (Markowitz, 1991). The actual degree of effectiveness, in this case, can only be 
assessed by evaluating the covariance between each pair of utilities in the pool, as will be done 
later in this analysis. The critical feature, of course, is that as covariance decreases, the variance 

































about the mean in the distribution of aggregate payouts will be reduced, lowering the size of the 
reserves that an insurer must maintain.  
 
2.2.4 Determining the effects of risk pooling 
The remainder of this analysis focuses on the set of 143 utilities that exhibit a positive 
correlation between the streamflow index and revenues, and the set of 245 utilities that exhibit a 
positive correlation between the PHDI index and revenues. This work provides an opportunity to 
explore the effectiveness of two different index contracts on the financial risk of the utilities that 
are exposed to drought. Since the utilities that compose these two groups of index contracts are 
not the same and the correlations between the index and revenues differ for each index, the 
results between them are not directly comparable in absolute terms. Rather, it is the relative 
difference between risk pooling strategies and those based on self-insurance or risk shifting 
approaches, compared across both the PHDI and streamflow indices, that provides insight into 
the effectiveness of risk pooling. 
Three scenarios are compared to assess the advantages of risk pooling: self-insurance, 
risk shifting, and risk pooling. These scenarios can be thought of as representing situations in 
which: each utility elects to set aside sufficient reserves to self-insure (self-insurance), each 
utility signs a separate contract with a different insurer (risk shifting), or all the utilities 
collectively pool their risks and are managed by one insurer (risk pooling). Whether the risks are 
pooled or managed independently (via self-insurance or risk-shifting), some level of reserves 
will need to be maintained to compensate for drought-induced losses. The size of these reserves, 
one for pooled risks and the other an aggregate of individual reserves (maintained by the utilities 
or the set of third party insurers), will be directly proportional to the opportunity costs of 
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maintaining that reserve. To make the scenarios comparable, the size of these reserves will be 
described in terms of the value at risk (VaR), set at the 99.5% level.  
In order to evaluate the impacts of risk pooling, several assumptions must be made to 
develop contracts and set levels of coverage. To do this, the utilities are separated into three 
groups based on different correlation levels (high, medium, and low) between the hydrologic 
index (streamflow or PHDI) and operating revenue. This also allows for some distinction 
between the amounts of coverage assumed to be purchased by each group, with the thought that 
those experiencing a high correlation between the index and revenues (i.e. those most at risk) 
would likely purchase more coverage. 
The PHDI and streamflow values at which utilities would most likely desire some level 
of financial risk mitigation for drought events were determined based on standardized values 
indicating severe drought. For the PHDI index, a value below -3 is considered to represent 
“severe drought” (Palmer, 1965), so it was used as the strike value for the PHDI-based contract. 
For streamflow, any normalized value falling more than 1 standard deviation below the mean is 
considered severe drought. One standard deviation below the mean covers the lowest 16% of 
streamflow events which is comparable to the 18% of events classified as moderate to extreme 
drought based upon PHDI (Alley, 1984). As PHDI is already normalized for each climate 
division, the same PHDI strike value (-3) is used for each utility’s contract. In the case of 
streamflow-based contracts, each utility’s contract has its strike set at one standard deviation 
below the mean, but this translates to a different streamflow level for each. A general depiction 
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(A) Determine the  
      strike of the payout    
      function 
 
The strike value for the 
contract was -3 for PHDI or 
the streamflow value 
corresponding to 1 standard 
deviation below the mean 
(B) Determine the slope  
      (m) of the payout  
      function 
 
The slope of the correlation 
between the PHDI or raw 
streamflow data and the 
detrended revenue data 
represents the positive slope 







(C) D t rmine the  
      distribution of  
      payouts 
 The distribution of payouts 
is based on the pre-specified 
values for the strike and 
payout slope (m) 
 
Figure 5. Identifying the strike, slope, and distribution of payouts characterizing each utility 
 
After the strike values are set, the slope and intercept of the payout function is established 
based on the relationship between the index and revenues (Figure 5B). These values determine 
the corresponding payout to each utility at any streamflow or PHDI level. In the third step, the 
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index in the previous year (recall the one-year lag). These data result in a distribution of payouts 
for each utility (Figure 5C). 
In order to accurately estimate the distribution of payouts, a reasonably long time series is 
helpful. There are 120 years (1896-2015) of PHDI data available for each of the 245 water 
utilities exhibiting positive correlation between PHDI and revenues. However, there are only 15 
years (2001-2015) of coincident streamflow data that span the entire set of 143 utilities 
considered. In order to more accurately analyze the payouts for the pool of 143 utilities with 
streamflow-indexed contracts, and to put the PHDI and streamflow analyses on equal footing, a 
120-year time series of synthetic streamflow data are generated for each utility. 
To do this, an autoregressive model for each of the 143 different streamflow datasets was 
developed based on the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) and the temporal partial 
autocorrelation function for each of the streamflow sites (Akaike, 1974; Shibata, 1976) (Note: 
discussion to this point has focused on spatial autocorrelation in drought conditions among 
different locations; The discussion is now shifting to temporal autocorrelation in streamflow at 
individual locations). The AIC indicates the best order for the model by balancing the tradeoffs 
between the model’s goodness-of-fit and the number of parameters while the temporal partial 
autocorrelation function indicates how much each year of lag contributes to the temporal 
autocorrelation, controlling for the other years. Assessing both the AIC and temporal partial 
autocorrelation functions, each of the 143 streamflow sites showed significant temporal 
autocorrelation for either no years (108 sites) or one year (35 sites). With either a zero or 1-year 
lag, the Thomas-Fiering Lag-1 Markov Model could be used to generate synthetic streamflow 
data (Thomas and Fiering, 1962; Box and Jenkins, 1976). This model has frequently been used 
for generating synthetic hydrologic time series data and allows for the covariance structure of the 
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historic streamflow data to be maintained (Stedinger and Taylor, 1982). The model uses 
normally distributed data, so streamflow data are log-transformed.  
The Thomas-Fiering model uses the mean, standard deviation, and temporal 
autocorrelation to generate synthetic streamflow (Q) data, such that the streamflow for the next 
year is based upon deviations from the historic mean of streamflow, as affected by the temporal 
autocorrelation and the standard deviation of the historic streamflow: 
 
 6789 = 	; + =>67 − ;? + @7AB1 − =D (2) 
 
where, 
QF89 = streamflow	for	the	next	year 
QF = streamflow	for	the	current	year 
µ = mean	of	streamflow	(based	on	historic	data) 
ρ = temporal	autocorrelation	(for	a	one	year	lag) 
Z = random	value	from	a	multivariate	normal	distribution	incorporating	covariance 
σ = standard	deviation	of	streamflow	(based	on	historic	data) 
 
 
In order to maintain the covariance between each of the 143 streamflow sites, the Z value 
is computed by taking the standardized normal value of a random value from a multivariate 
distribution between each of the sites that incorporates the respective covariance matrix. For each 
pair of sites, an eigenvalue decomposition is carried out to decompose the covariance matrix into 
an orthogonal matrix of eigenvectors and a diagonal matrix of eigenvalues (Kaas et al., 2008). 
When the eigenvectors are multiplied by the square root of the eigenvalues and the random 
standard normal value, a random value that maintains the covariance between the utilities is 
created. This value is then standardized by the mean and standard deviation of the particular 
streamflow site. To ensure that the synthetic streamflow values maintain the same covariance 
between sites as the historic streamflow data, the covariance matrix of the synthetic streamflow 
values is compared to the historic by calculating a linear regression of all the covariance values. 
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The Pearson correlation value between them is 0.975, indicating that the covariance of the 
synthetic streamflow data does well in maintaining the historic covariance structure. 
Once the distribution of payouts for each utility is determined, the 99.5% VaR for both 
the risk pooling and the risk shifting scenarios is determined via simulation, without making any 
assumptions about the distributional form of the payouts (Damodaran, 2008). While the payouts 
for the streamflow-indexed contracts are based on 120 years of synthetic streamflow data from 
an autoregressive model, historical simulation with time series models can also be used to 
accurately calculate VaR (Cabedo and Moya, 2003). Simulation using historical or synthetic time 
series provides a non-parametric method of calculating VaR, which is necessary as the 
distribution of payouts for each utility is non-normal (Hendricks, 1997). To determine the 99.5% 
VaR for risk pooling across all utilities, the aggregate annual payouts are used. For both the 
PHDI and streamflow indices, there are 120 years of payout data, so the 99.5% VaR corresponds 
roughly to the 119th highest aggregate annual payout.  
For the risk shifting scenario, in which each utility is insured independently, the insurer 
needs to maintain the individual 99.5% VaR for each utility. Using the payouts from the historic 
and synthetic data for the PHDI-indexed and streamflow-indexed payouts, respectively, the 99.5 
percentile value of payouts was used for each utility and then these values were summed to 
determine the aggregate annual payout across all insured utilities.  
Contract pricing must also be addressed, with price (i.e. premium) being a function of 
both the expected payouts and the “loading”, a term used to describe the amount above the 
expected payouts that an insurer will charge to account for administrative/marketing costs, return 
on investment, and the opportunity cost of maintaining liquid reserves:  
  




Contract pricing for streamflow- and PHDI-indexed contracts is done by actuarial 
methods. There are various premium principles which are based on the expected payout with 
some additional amount that accounts for variance in the payout distribution (Hardy, 2006). In 
this case, the variance may not be the best indication of the risk level, due to the long tails of the 
distribution. Instead, modified risk measures, such as the Wang transform, are used to better 
indicate the price of the extreme risks through converting the distribution of payouts to “risk 
neutral” (Wang, 2002). This conversion more heavily weights the tails of the distribution (i.e. 
low-probability events) to account for the additional risk. It modifies the distribution as follows: 
  
   j∗(k) = 	Φ[Φm9>j(k)? − n]     (4) 
 
 where 
F(x) = 	cdf	of	payouts 
Φ = standard	normal	cdf 
λ = market	price	of	risk 
 
 
As these contracts are not currently being sold, there is no actual market price of risk that can be 
assigned here, but other weather derivative contracts have been priced using a value of 0.25, and 
the same value is assumed here [Wang, 2002].  
Once the distribution has been transformed, the adjusted premium can be determined by 
calculating the expected value of the modified distribution: 
 
 +gr%s&bg	eab(c%( = ∑[k ∗ j∗(k)]  (5) 
 
 
For each set of streamflow- and PHDI-indexed contracts (all, high, medium, and low risk 
utilities), adjusted premiums were calculated.   
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2.3 RESULTS 
For both the streamflow- and PHDI-indexed contracts, across all risk levels (high, 
medium, and low), risk pooling exhibits significant advantages as evidenced through 
substantially lower 99.5% VaR levels relative to risk shifting (which includes both self-insurance 
and contracts with separate third party insurers) (Figure 6). 
   
Figure 6. 99.5% VaR comparison across different utility risk levels for the group of insured 
utilities with indices related to streamflow (left) and PHDI (right) 
 
For the selected set of 143 utilities with streamflow-indexed contracts, the 99.5% VaR is 
$120M for risk shifting and $39M for risk pooling. This 68% reduction in required reserves 
indicates the substantial benefits of risk pooling due to a reduction in covariance between 
payouts when moving from risk shifting to risk pooling. Each of the high, medium, and low 
utility risk levels mimics this decrease in required reserves with reductions of 50%, 72%, and 
69%, respectively. The 99.5% VaR for risk shifting for the set of all 245 utilities with PHDI-
indexed contracts is $295M, while for risk pooling, it is only $113M. Moving from risk shifting 
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groups of utility risk levels results in reductions as well, of 57%, 55%, and 26% for high, 
medium, and low risk utilities, respectively.  
 Reductions in required reserves resulting from risk pooling provide potential benefits to 
both the insurers and the insured utilities. For the insurers, reducing the amount of money in its 
required liquid reserves results in a decrease in opportunity costs. If the money that is no longer 
required for the liquid reserves is instead invested in less liquid investments (earning a higher 
return), an increase in capital gains can be returned directly to insured utilities (in the case of a 
mutual), or, presumably trickle down as lower premium payments. While the returns on a more 
liquid reserve fund and a more illiquid investment will vary by insurer, some assumptions can be 
made for the purpose of developing an illustrative example. Presume the liquid reserve is 
maintained in a safe and accessible form, something similar to a money market fund, which over 
the last 10 years, has earned, on average, 0.25% annually (Federal Reserve Economic Data, 
2017). Maintaining this fund requires foregoing investment in something with higher earning 
potential. For the sake of this example, assume that the alternative for a utility that did not have 
to maintain the large liquid reserve would be a diversified (yet less liquid) portfolio earning a 
long-term average return over the last 10 years of 4.75% (Federal Reserve Economic Data, 
2017). In risk shifting, the insurer would be required to maintain larger liquid reserves (assumed 
to earn 0.25%) due to the higher VaR value and forego the higher earnings associated with the 
less liquid investments.  
For the 143 streamflow-indexed contracts, the opportunity cost to the insurer of 
maintaining the 99.5% VaR when risk pooling is $1.8M while it is $5.4M for risk shifting 
(Figure 7).  
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Figure 7. Opportunity costs of maintaining larger liquid reserves for risk pooling versus risk 
shifting for streamflow-based contracts (left) and PHDI-based contracts (right).  
 
This 208% increase in opportunity cost ($3.6M) indicates how much money an insurer 
that is risk shifting must forego to maintain more of its reserves in a lower-earning, more liquid 
fund, compared to risk pooling. For each of the high, medium, and low utility risk levels, 
additional opportunity costs from risk shifting instead of risk pooling amount to $1.6M, $1.4M, 
and $0.5M, respectively. The PHDI-indexed contracts have similar differences in opportunity 
cost between risk pooling and risk shifting. For the full set of 245 PHDI-indexed contracts, the 
difference in opportunity cost from higher required reserve levels for risk shifting compared to 
risk pooling would amount to $8.2M annually (160% increase) (Figure 7). In the case of the 
high, medium, and low utility risk levels, the difference in opportunity cost between risk shifting 
and risk pooling is $3.5M, $3.2M, and $0.7M, respectively. The results from both the 
streamflow- and PHDI-indexed contracts indicate that substantial cost reductions are achievable 
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From the water utility’s perspective, lower opportunity costs should translate to lower 
costs associated with participating in a mutual, or lower prices for the insurance contract. As the 
premium represents the sum of the expected payout plus loading, with the latter being related, at 
least in part, to the opportunity costs of maintaining the reserve, risk pooling (with lower 
opportunity costs) should be cheaper than risk shifting. The contract loading depends on the 
market price of risk (l), assumed to be 0.25 based on existing weather derivative contracts 
(Wang, 2002; Dorfleitner and Wimmer, 2010). To evaluate the sensitivity of the market price of 
risk, a range of values from 0.2 to 0.3 is assessed to determine the effects on the loading and 
thereby the total premiums. For the full set of 143 utilities with streamflow-based contracts, the 
cumulative contract loading (with l=0.25) is $1.8M (18% of the expected payout) for risk 
pooling and $4.6M (47% of the expected payout) for risk shifting (Figure 8).  
 
Figure 8. Expected payout and contract loading costs for risk shifting and risk pooling for 
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For a lower market price of risk (l=0.2), the contract loading decreases to $1.4M for risk 
pooling and $3.4M for risk shifting, and for a higher market price of risk (l=0.3), the contract 
loading increases to $2.2M and $5.6M for risk pooling and risk shifting, respectively. Similarly, 
the contract loading is lower for risk pooling compared to risk shifting for the high, medium, and 
low risk levels by $1M, $0.8M, and $0.3M, respectively (l=0.25), by $0.8M, $0.6M, and $0.3M, 
respectively (with l=0.2), and by $1.3M, $1M, and $0.4M, respectively (with l=0.3).  
Across all 245 utilities with PHDI-based contracts, the contract loading is $2.4M less for 
risk pooling, compared to risk shifting (l=0.25). The contract loading is $4.9M (39% of the 
expected value) for risk pooling and $7.3M (59% of the expected value) for risk shifting. For the 
different values of market price of risk, the loading is $5.9M for risk poling and $9M for risk 
shifting (l=0.3), and $3.8M for risk pooling and $5.7M for risk shifting (l=0.2). For the high, 
medium, and low risk levels, the contract loading is lower for risk pooling compared to risk 
shifting by $0.8M, $0.8M, and $0.2M (l=0.25), respectively, by $0.7M, $0.6M, and $0.2M, 
respectively (l=0.2), and by $1.2M, $1M, and $0.3M, respectively (l=0.3).  
Similarly, from a utility’s perspective, not only is it important to minimize the index 
insurance premium through a lower loading, but it also plays a role in determining the relative 
benefits of index-insurance versus self-insurance. For self-insurance, the cost to a utility is the 
opportunity cost of foregone investing in a higher earning fund (returns of 4.75%). Thus, the 
choice between the two will be significantly affected by a comparison of the opportunity cost of 
self-insurance and the loading cost of an index insurance contract, with the latter being directly 
related to the size of the reserve the insurer must maintain. The contract loading cost is affected 
by the market price of risk, which is assumed to be 0.25. However, a range from 0.2 to 0.3 is 
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used to calculate the loading cost to determine the sensitivity of the loading cost from the market 
price of risk.    
For the set of 143 utilities with streamflow-based contracts, the annual opportunity cost 
of self-insurance is $5.7M, which is larger than the loading cost for risk pooling by $3.9M 
(l=0.25)  and larger than the loading cost for risk shifting by $1.1M (l=0.25) (Figure 9). 
Figure 9. Opportunity cost of self-insurance versus contract loading costs under different levels 
of risk and insurance strategy 
 
The high, medium, and low risk levels of utilities mimic this same pattern in which the 
loading cost for risk pooling and risk shifting is less than the opportunity cost of self-insurance 
across the range of market price of risk values from 0.2 to 0.3. For the set of 245 utilities with 
PHDI-based contracts, the pattern is the same, with lower contract loading costs compared to the 
opportunity cost of self-insurance for both risk pooling and risk shifting across the range of 
market price of risk values from 0.2 to 0.3. The opportunity cost of self-insurance for all 245 
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(l=0.25), and by $6.7M (l=0.25) for risk shifting. For each of the groups of high, medium, and 
low risk utilities, the contract loading for both risk pooling and risk shifting is also lower than the 
opportunity cost of self-insurance across the range of market price of risk values from 0.2 to 0.3.  
The effectiveness of the pooled insurance contracts will also depend on the ability of the 
insurer to make payouts in all years. As an illustrative example, a sequence of 45 years (from 
1970-2014) of synthetic streamflow data are used to show how reserves accumulate over time 
and can be used to make payouts, even when payouts in certain years are significantly greater 
than premiums received (Figure 10).  
 
Figure 10. Total payouts, premiums, and reserves over the synthetic period 1970-2014 for the 
streamflow-indexed insurance contracts 
 
In this illustrative example, the reserves start at zero to demonstrate their growth, relative 
to the premiums received. However, an insurer will start from a steady state with some reserves 
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larger than premiums received by the insurer, however because of the accumulated reserves from 
1970 and 1972, the insurer is able to make these payouts. Over the next eleven years (1973–
1984), payouts are less than premiums, so the reserves increase each year, accumulating to $69M 
in 1984. From 1985 to 1995, half of the years result in higher payouts than premiums, but 
otherwise the payouts are less than premiums, so the total reserves remain above $50M. In 1998, 
a payout of $40M causes the reserves to drop to $7M, however the reserves steadily climb up 
until 2013 where they peak at $99M. Throughout the 45 years, the insurer is able to remain 
solvent while still making large payouts in back to back years (1995-1998), which may be more 
difficult for a utility that is risk shifting or self-insuring. Certainly this time series does not reflect 
all possible scenarios, but should provide some insight into premium-reserve dynamics.  
   
2.4 DISCUSSION 
In considering risk pooling for use in managing drought-related financial losses for water 
utilities, it becomes apparent that pooling across regions with some degree of spatial 
autocorrelation in hydrologic conditions is advantageous in that it: (1) creates financial contracts 
that are generalizable across water utilities, and (2) lowers the premiums on a financial contract 
for utilities as it reduces the opportunity cost to insurers. As premiums decline, these risk pooling 
arrangements look increasingly attractive compared to separate risk-shifting contracts or self-
insurance.  
The slowing development of new supply and the consequent increased reliance on 
conservation as a means of managing drought have impacted utility finances to the point that 
credit rating agencies have noticed. As of 2016, a new factor in determining a water utility’s 
credit rating is an assessment of its drought management plans (Chapman and Breeding, 2016). 
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Due to this, water utility managers are now beginning to investigate new methods to meet these 
new criteria and improve their finances, leading them to potentially explore risk pooling through 
index-based insurance. 
The benefits of risk pooling are clear when the market price of risk (l, eqn. 4) is assumed 
to be 0.25. While the market price of risk changes the benefits of risk pooling, the sensitivity 
analysis carried out over the range of values from 0.2 to 0.3 indicates that even with a higher 
market price of risk (l=0.3), there are still cost savings from risk pooling.   
While the number and geographic distribution of utilities considered suggest these results 
are reasonably robust, more data, particularly on utility revenues (the limiting factor), would 
allow for a more detailed investigation. Nonetheless, the location of these utilities across 68 
NOAA climate divisions suggest that the benefits of risk pooling using an indexed contract could 
be substantial.  
The addition of more utilities to the pool across more hydrologic regions would most 
likely increase the benefits of risk pooling as the distribution of aggregate payouts converges to 
the mean and covariance between payouts decreases. As the group of participating utilities 
changes, the benefits of risk pooling may be increased or decreased, based upon the geographic 
diversity of the group. If at any time many water utilities leave the risk pool, and only 
geographically similar utilities remain, the benefits of the risk pool may diminish substantially.   
Results indicate that water utilities experience a broad range of exposure to hydrologic-
based financial risks, with some quite vulnerable while others are largely unaffected, at least with 
respect to the indices evaluated. Many factors contribute to this, including a utility’s pricing 
schedule (fixed versus volumetric costs). However, there are over 15,000 surface water utilities 
in the United States and there could be as many as 4,000 utilities whose revenues are strongly 
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correlated (R>0.5) with streamflow and therefore sufficiently exposed that they may be keen to 
benefit from some form of financial risk management, with risk pooling demonstrating distinct 
promise.  
Each water utility will ultimately decide upon a portfolio of risk management strategies 
to best mitigate different levels of risk. Risk pooling may be part of this portfolio, but will only 
be a possible solution if the coordination to develop a risk pool can be achieved. If the 
development of a risk pool is initiated, it will be important for future work to investigate the 
individual premiums that each utility contributes to the risk pool as well as the equitable 
distribution of dividends to each.     
 
2.5 CONCLUSION 
These results suggest that drought-related financial risks can be effectively pooled for 
water utilities to reduce the cost of protecting themselves from drought-related losses via an 
index-based financial contract. Despite some degree of spatial autocorrelation in the hydrologic 
indices considered, and thus in the insurance payouts, risk pooling can significantly lower the 
reserves required to reliably make aggregate payouts, especially relative to risk shifting. With 
significantly lower reserve requirements should come significantly lower contract prices, and 
combining this with a relatively simple and transparent index, should increase the appeal of these 
financial contracts. 
Given that water utilities are faced with a changing landscape that is more dependent on 
temporary actions (such as conservation) to manage more extreme droughts, and recent work has 
recognized the critical role of financial tools in mitigating financial risks from these drought 
events, this work helps to add an additional improved solution to mitigating financial losses. 
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Ultimately, through the use of these financial instruments, water utilities could help to not only 
improve their financial risk management but also improve water resource management. If 
utilities are less concerned over the financial losses associated with lower volumetric sales, then 
they may be more likely to make greater use of conservation in their planning, reducing the need 
to develop expensive new supplies. This will benefit utilities in terms of greater financial 
stability and improved credit ratings, as well as utility customers who should experience lower 
prices over the long-term.  
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CHAPTER 3: MITIGATING DROUGHT-RELATED FINANCIAL RISKS FOR 
WATER UTILITIES VIA INTEGRATION OF RISK POOLING AND REINSURANCE2 
 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
Reliance on supply-side solutions for managing drought, typically through the 
maintenance of large volumes of rarely used capacity, has become less practical due to the higher 
costs and limited availability of new sources and more restrictive environmental permitting 
(NRC 2012; Brajer et al. 1989; Leurig 2010). Consequently, more adaptive solutions, such as 
conservation or transfers of existing supplies have become increasingly attractive (Lund and 
Israel 1995; Beecher and Chesnutt 2012; Gleick 2003; Ho et al. 2017; Kundzewicz et al. 2007; 
Brown and Carriquiry 2007).  These approaches can, however, result in significant financial 
losses during drought, as conservation often reduces revenues, while temporary supply 
augmentation (e.g. transfers) can increase costs (Hughes et al. 2014; Tiger et al. 2014).  The 
intermittent nature and varying levels of these losses correspond to drought frequency and 
severity, both of which are uncertain and add to the challenges of managing the accompanying 
financial risk (Olmstead and Stavins 2009; Donnelly and Christian-Smith 2013; Schmidt and 
Lewis 2017). As water utilities typically employ a straight forward budget model in which prices 
are set to recover costs, and often have difficulty raising prices quickly in response to drought, 
even a five percent reduction in revenues can pose serious financial challenges (Zeff et al. 2014). 
                                               
2 Baum, R. and Characklis, G. W. (in review). Mitigating drought-related financial risks for water utilities via 
integration of risk pooling and reinsurance. Journal of Water Resources Planning and Management.  
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Financial disruptions can lead to downgrades of a utility’s credit rating, and the water utility 
sector’s greater reliance on adaptive measures has begun to manifest in increased financial 
instability for many utilities (Chapman and Breeding 2016). As a result, ratings agencies have 
introduced new evaluation criteria designed to account for the effects of hydrologic variability, 
and a rating downgrade will lead to higher interest rates and increased debt service costs, 
jeopardizing a utility’s long-term financial health (Chapman 2012; Donnelly and Christian-Smith 
2013).  
Managing these financial risks is typically accomplished through some combination of a 
reserve fund and drought pricing (Leurig 2012; Hughes and Leurig 2013). However, previous 
research has evaluated these tools in terms of their advantages and limitations, and demonstrates 
that financial instruments, such as index-insurance, can be comparatively more effective in 
managing the risks posed by more severe drought (Zeff and Characklis 2013; Zeff et al. 2014; 
Baum et al. 2018). The literature describes financial instruments that have been tailored to 
individual water utilities (Zeff and Characklis 2013; Brown and Carriquiry 2007) as well as 
standardized instruments that have been applied to a geographically distributed pool of water 
utilities (Baum et al. 2018). Pooling financial risks over broad geographic regions, involving 
(mostly) uncorrelated drought risks can lower the insurer’s capital reserve requirements, often set 
by regulators at very high levels, up to the 99.5% value at risk (VaR) level (i.e. a level that 
ensures the ability to provide payouts with 99.5% confidence) (Johnson 2015; IAIS 2017). Risk 
pooling allows a reduction in the size of the reserves, lowering the costs associated with raising 
and/or maintaining reserves, and thereby leading to the potential for reduced premiums (Baum et 
al. 2018). Lower costs may lead to greater uptake of these financial tools by utilities and the 
development of less expensive financial risk management strategies overall.  
 56 
Even with risk pooling, however, severe (low probability, high risk) events can drive 
insurance payouts to levels that require the maintenance of very large reserves (Johnson 2015; 
IAIS 2017).  As reserves must be maintained in a liquid form in order to be rapidly accessed, 
they typically earn a very low return, giving rise to high opportunity costs of capital.  One way to 
reduce these costs is for an insurer to transfer some portion of the risk to a third party, often via 
reinsurance (Edesess 2015), reducing the required reserves. Reinsurance is often used by insurers 
to reduce tail risk associated with very rare, but costly, events (Schanz et al. 2010; Scordis and 
Steinorth 2012), effectively providing insurance to an insurer (Figure 11). 
 
Figure 11. Flow of funds for insuring with and without reinsurance 
This analysis is undertaken from the perspective of a mutual, which operates in much the 
same way as a risk pooling insurer, except that it is collectively owned by its members.  A 
mutual typically pools similar, but independent, risks, each of which is relatively small compared 
to the pool itself, as a means of reducing variability in total payouts (Smith and Kane 1994), with 
auto collision insurance providing an illustrative example. Reinsurers, however, typically have 








































uncorrelated risks, reducing the probability of larger than expected payouts, for example, by 
providing coverage against losses from natural disasters in multiple locations (Wu 2015). In this 
way, reinsurers often have a lower opportunity cost of capital, relative to a mutual with a more 
singular exposure, and thereby allows the reinsurer to provide a cost-effective alternative to a 
mutual seeking to reduce its exposure to the risks of extreme events (Subramanian and Wang 
2018).  
When considering reinsurance, an important question arises as to the amount of risk a 
mutual should transfer to a reinsurer. One presumed objective, in this case, would be to minimize 
the costs of meeting regulatory reserve requirements designed to assure that payouts can be 
made. While purchasing reinsurance reduces the capital costs for an insurer, reinsurance also 
involves costs, and these vary based on the probability and magnitude of the covered risk 
(Cummins et al. 2008; Froot 2001). Thus, insurers often find it practical to purchase reinsurance 
when the benefits of reducing the reserve requirement (i.e. lower costs of capital) outweigh its 
costs (Fu and Khury 2010).  
Previous work has assessed the benefits of pooling drought-related financial risks for a 
set of spatially distributed water utilities (Baum et al. 2018), but long tail risks associated with 
widespread and/or severe drought still impose large reserve requirements on an insurer or 
mutual. However, the degree to which a mutual might cost effectively transfer some of this long 
tail risk to another party, namely through reinsurance, has not been explored. Nonetheless, 
studies from other sectors with weather-related risks, such as agriculture, have investigated the 
joint use of reinsurance and risk pooling to mitigate financial losses from adverse weather (Porth 
et al. 2015; Porth et al. 2016). These studies used historical records of insurance, reinsurance, 
and loss data to identify combinations of risk pooling and reinsurance that significantly 
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outperformed pooling alone, resulting in lower costs and a lower risk of insolvency for the 
insurer. While weather is often a dominant risk, most crop insurance is a form of indemnity in 
which payouts are based directly on realized losses. This work focuses on index insurance, in 
which losses are tied to a specified environmental metric, rather than an assessment of the losses 
themselves. Index-based instruments can have some distinct advantages (e.g. lower transaction 
costs, less subjectivity in determining payouts, less concern over moral hazard), but their 
effectiveness is linked to the degree of correlation between the index and the realized losses. 
This research is conducted from the standpoint of a mutual that must choose the level of 
reinsurance that will minimize its costs of meeting its regulatory reserve requirements (as 
measured by the 99.5% VaR). The mutual has pooled drought-related financial risks for a 
spatially distributed group of water utilities via index insurance contracts linked to the Palmer 
Hydrologic Drought Index (PHDI), an index chosen based on earlier work that compared its 
effectiveness with several other candidate indices (e.g., precipitation, streamflow) (Baum et al. 
2018). The analysis is conducted for a generalized group of publicly owned surface water 
utilities distributed across all 344 climate divisions of the contiguous U.S. The first objective is 
characterizing the distribution of financial losses from drought events of varying severity and 
spatial extent over the 120-year historical record of PHDI values observed in each climate 
division. Then the financial losses for each climate division are estimated and pooled for analysis 
over a synthetic 100,000-year record based on the 120-year historical record. The net cost (a 
more explicit definition will be provided later) of insuring utilities with various reinsurance 
contract designs is then evaluated, and the reinsurance contract resulting in the lowest average 
annual net cost is used to determine the net cost of a combined pooling and reinsurance strategy 
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over a 10-year period. Results should provide insight into potential approaches for better 
managing drought-related financial risks over individual and multi-year periods.  
 
3.2 METHODS 
A key consideration in developing a mutual, as opposed to engaging with a third-party 
insurer, is that a mutual is owned by its policyholders who contribute capital to build up the 
mutual's reserves. As a result of contributing their own capital, mutuals typically will charge 
lower premiums (Pain et al. 2016; AMICE 2016; Hartwig and Alldredge 2018). Premiums are a 
function of both the insurer’s estimate of expected payouts and the additional “loading” on the 
contract, with the latter accounting for the insurer’s administrative costs, product development, 
and the opportunity costs of capital associated with maintaining regulatory reserve requirements 
(the 99.5% VaR). While a mutual can build its reserves slowly over time through assessments on 
its members in the early years after its formation, a newly formed mutual will establish the 
appropriate reserve level immediately by issuing debt, typically in the form of a bond.  This 
approach allows it to meet specified reserve requirements without a long waiting period, and 
then assess members the cost of servicing this debt over time. In this work, these costs are 
referred to as “debt service costs”. The distribution of payouts to member utilities is determined 
by assessing the frequency and magnitude of payouts to a subset of insured surface water utilities 
from across the U.S. The payouts come as a result of these utilities using a PHDI-based index 
insurance contract to limit financial losses arising from severe drought events. Payouts are 
estimated based on nationwide simulations of PHDI, developed using an approach that maintains 
the spatial and temporal autocorrelation across all 344 climate divisions in the contiguous U.S. 
The generalized structure of index insurance contracts based on PHDI is described, with 
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contracts tailored to each climate division by extrapolating results from earlier research based on 
financial data and drought metrics obtained from 372 surface water utilities distributed across the 
U.S. (Baum et al. 2018).  
Once the distribution of aggregate annual payouts made by the mutual is determined, an 
analysis is conducted to evaluate the mutual’s lowest cost strategy for meeting a given certainty 
level in the ability to make these payouts. This strategy involves maintaining its own reserves, 
through a combination of debt issuance (i.e. bond) and member premiums (both of which have 
costs to members), and transferring some portion of the “tail risk” of more extreme events to a 
third party via reinsurance (which also has a cost, primarily that associated with the “loading” 
charged by the reinsurer). Reinsurance contracts are considered across a range of thresholds to 
identify the lowest cost combination of risk pooling and reinsurance, evaluating the costs 
realized by the mutual’s member utilities in any single year, as well as over a 10-year period, and 
tracking the stability of the mutual’s reserve levels over multiple years.   
 
3.2.1 Generating synthetic PHDI data 
Earlier work describes the correlation between utility revenues and a range of drought-
related metrics (Baum et al. 2018).  These included the Palmer Hydrologic Drought Index 
(PHDI) and cumulative measures of streamflow and precipitation (e.g. annual, seasonal, 
monthly) using data from 372 publicly owned, geographically diverse surface water utilities 
spread across 78 different climate divisions in the U.S. The PHDI is a measure of drought, 
normalized to conditions in each climate division with possible values between -12 and 12. 
Positive values indicate wetter conditions, while negative values indicate drier conditions, with 
values above an absolute value of 3 representing severe conditions. Thus, a PHDI of -4 indicates 
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very severe drought. It is also important to note that a similar PHDI level measured in two 
different climate divisions represents the same relative deviation from historic norms, not 
identical drought conditions as some regions are wetter/drier than others.  
From a financial perspective, utility revenues are the primary metric of interest as utility 
costs are typically fixed and mostly a function of debt-service (Hanemann 1997; Hughes et al. 
2014), making variations in revenue a reasonable surrogate for net revenues, the primary 
measure of financial stability (Zeff and Characklis 2013; Zeff et al. 2014). In this analysis, utility 
revenues were most strongly correlated with PHDI, with 17% of the evaluated water utilities 
having a Pearson correlation value above 0.5 and an additional 19% having a Pearson correlation 
value between 0.25 and 0.5. This suggests that 36% of the examined water utilities experience 
some significant level of vulnerability to drought-related financial risks, as measured by PHDI. 
The assumption is that the other utilities are either less financially vulnerable to drought based on 
higher supply-to-demand ratios (which reduces the need to conserve), or employ alternative tools 
for managing drought-related financial risks (e.g. drought pricing, reserve funds) that are 
sufficient to reduce their risk to acceptable levels. Index insurance is then used for managing 
financial risks from severe drought. For a more detailed comparison, and integration, of the tools 
used for managing drought-related financial risks for water utilities, see Zeff and Characklis 
2013 and Zeff et al. 2014. 
Data on PHDI are available for all 344 climate divisions in the U.S. over a 120-year 
period from 1895-2015. In order to better estimate drought-related financial risks for surface 
water utilities across the U.S. (beyond the 372 utilities in the 78 climate divisions considered in 
earlier research), synthetic PHDI data are produced to extend the PHDI record (based on historic 
data available from the NOAA Climatic Data Center (2017)). In creating the synthetic PHDI 
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data, it is important to preserve the spatial and temporal autocorrelation in the observed data 
across all 344 climate divisions. Autoregressive models that incorporate the spatial 
autocorrelation of the historic data are used to generate 100,000 years of synthetic PHDI values 
for each climate division. The spatial autocorrelation matrix is calculated based on the historic 
PHDI data across all climate divisions and then broken down, using singular value 
decomposition, to generate a matrix of random values (@7) composed of a diagonal singular 
matrix (D), and left and right eigenvectors (U and V) from the historic PHDI data (Onorati et al. 
2013), such that  
 @7 = √v ∗ V ∗ U	 (6) 
where, 
  
U = $a&ℎ$i$h"f	("&ack	$z	fbz&	bcibh1b{&$as 
v = gc"i$h"f	schi%f"a	("&ack	$z	bcibh1"f%bs 
| = $a&ℎ$i$h"f	("&ack	$z	aciℎ&	bcibh1b{&$as	
 
These random values (@7) are then used in the autoregressive models to generate 
synthetic PHDI values, with models for each climate division determined based on the Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC) and the temporal partial autocorrelation function (Akaike 1974; 
Shibata 1976) (Figure 12).  
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Figure 12. Number of autoregressive lags determined to be significant for each climate division   
The AIC aids in model selection by selecting a lag time that minimizes model 
information loss by quantifying tradeoffs between the goodness-of-fit of the model and the total 
number of parameters. The partial autocorrelation function indicates the influence of each lagged 
year on overall temporal autocorrelation, controlling for the other years. The autoregressive 
models for PHDI in each climate divisions are best fit using either a one-year lag (AR(1)) (180 
climate divisions) or a two-year lag (AR(2)) model (164 climate divisions).   
The Thomas-Fiering model has frequently been used in generating synthetic hydrologic 
data as it maintains the spatial and temporal autocorrelation of the historic data (Stedinger and 
Taylor 1982). Synthetic PHDI values are calculated using the Thomas-Fiering Lag-1 Markov 
model (Equation 7) for AR(1) models, and a higher lag modification of the model (Equation 8) is 
used for AR(2) models (Reddy 1997; Singh and Yadava 2003).  
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Synthetic PHDI data exhibit a similar distribution to historic PHDI, with mean values 
being nearly identical (historic 0.1501, synthetic 0.1496) and the standard deviation differing 
only slightly (historic 2.051, synthetic 1.999) (Figure 13). Spatial autocorrelation of synthetic 
PHDI values also matches historic observations, fitting a linear model with an R2 of 0.9987.  
 
Figure 13. Annual PHDI data for all 344 climate divisions for historic data (from 1895-2015) 
and synthetic data (100,000 years)   
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 65 
 
3.2.2 Designing index-based insurance contracts 
Even given similar levels of drought, not every surface water utility will be subject to the 
same level of financial risk, as various idiosyncrasies, such as pricing structure, supply-to-
demand ratio, or other utility specific characteristics will impact each differently. While 
information on a utility’s specific circumstances in all these areas is not available, a strong 
correlation between PHDI and utility revenues is assumed to indicate that a utility faces a 
situation in which it is financially vulnerable to drought. For the set of 372 surface water utilities 
for which revenue data is available, 17% (63 utilities) and 36% (134 utilities) were identified as 
having higher levels of drought-related financial risk, as measured by correlations between 
revenue and PHDI greater than 0.5 and 0.25, respectively (Baum et al. 2018). This subset of high 
risk utilities (R > 0.25) was further analyzed in an attempt to identify any patterns in location or 
size that would give rise to additional risk relative to the other utilities without higher 
correlations between PHDI and revenues, but no patterns were observed.  
These results were therefore extrapolated across the U.S., such that 36% of the population 
in each climate division served by surface water utilities is assumed to be representative of the 
set of utilities considered at risk with respect to drought-related financial losses, and to purchase 
index insurance against severe droughts (PHDI ≤ -3). Values for the population served by 
surface water utilities (as reported in 2017) are obtained from the Environmental Protection 
Agency’s (EPA) Safe Drinking Water Information System (SDWIS) Federal Reports and 
overlaid with climate division boundaries to determine the population served by publicly 
operated surface water utilities in each climate division (EPA 2017) (Figure 14). 
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Figure 14. Current populations served by publicly operated surface water utilities for each of 
344 climate divisions  
 
Once the synthetic PHDI values and subset of population served by at risk surface water 
utilities are determined for each climate division, index-based insurance contracts are created so 
that the simulation to estimate the distribution of annual payouts for the set of all mutual member 
utilities nationwide can be developed. Each index-based insurance contract is based on the PHDI 
and involves the specification of a strike value (k), below which payouts begin, and a slope (m), 
that reflects the line of best fit between the PHDI index and the revenues, which has a slope with 
units of $/PHDI unit (Figure 15). In this case, a contract with a PHDI strike value of -3 (severe 
drought) is established for all 344 climate divisions. The slope for each contract varies based on 
the relationship between PHDI and revenues existing in that climate division, as determined by a 
generalized relationship between PHDI and revenues scaled to the population served by at risk 




Figure 15. Generic structure of PHDI-indexed insurance payout with a strike of -3   
The generalized population-weighted relationship between PHDI and revenues is 
determined based on the median slope per capita across the set of 134 at risk utilities, as 
established from earlier work (Baum et al. 2018). The payout slope per capita for each of these 
utilities is determined by dividing each utility’s payout slope (i.e. line of best fit between 
revenues and PHDI) by its population served. The median slope per capita across the 134 utilities 
is 0.005 $/PHDI unit, meaning that there is a 0.005 increase in the slope of the payouts for each 
additional person in the climate division. This value is used with the subset of the population 
served by at risk utilities in each climate division to calculate the payout slopes for each of the 
344 climate divisions of the contiguous U.S. For example, a climate division with a population of 
100,000 served by at risk utilities, would have a payout line slope of 500 ($/PHDI unit) whereas 
a climate division with a population of 1,000,000 served by at risk utilities would have a contract 
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Once the index-based insurance contracts are designed for the at risk utilities in each 
climate division, the payouts can be determined over the synthetic PHDI dataset of 100,000 
years. At each annual timestep, the aggregate annual payout is determined based on the annual 
average of monthly PHDI values in each climate division (v), the strike value (k) of -3, and the 
payout slope (m), a unique payout value for each climate division (i), such that 
 
 +iiabi"&b	"hh%"f	e"#$%& = ∑[(á ∗ *+,>(/ − 1á), 0?]	   (9) 
 
 
Simulating payouts over the synthetic period of 100,000 years yields an aggregate annual 
expected payout of $20.5M across all 344 climate divisions. While payouts are less than this 
expected level 73% of the time, they are more than twice this level in 16% of years, and more 
than 8 times the expected payout 1% of the time (Figure 16). These low probability, high 
consequence years with very high payouts make a strong case for employing reinsurance, as the 
mutual’s required reserves, would need to be maintained at a very high level to manage these 
events in a way consistent with regulatory requirements (up to the 99.5% VaR). There may, 
therefore, be significant potential for the reserve size to be reduced with reinsurance, lowering 




Figure 16. Distribution of the annual payouts for the risk pool and the highest 1% of annual 
payouts 
 
3.2.3 Pricing index insurance contracts 
The total price for insuring the populations served by at risk surface water utilities across 
all 344 climate divisions is determined by the expected payouts to insured parties and an 
additional “loading” factor, which accounts for a number of factors, including the costs of 
administration, research, and marketing: 
  Pab(c%( = d[e"#$%&] + 	f$"gchi   (10) 
The loading for the mutual is assumed to be a constant fraction of the expected payout, in this 
case 25%, based on average expense ratios of mutuals (Hartwig and Alldredge 2018). Based on 
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The mutual achieves the required level of reserves by issuing a 30-year bond in an 
amount reflective of the 99.5% VaR ($212M), for which it makes constant annual payments. 
Based on an average of the range of investment-grade bonds (rated Baa to AAA) over the period 
2008-2018, the bond coupon rate is 4.92% (Municipal Securities Rulemaking Board 2019; 
Federal Reserve Economic Data 2019). Using this value, the amortized annual bond payment for 
the mutual is $13.6M (on the $212M bond). The cost of capital can be substantial, and in this 
case, with a required reserve level more than 10 times the expected annual payout ($20.5M), the 
mutual will have to maintain a significant fraction of the reserves that will very rarely be used. 
Transferring some of this more severe “tail” risk is likely to be cost effective.  
 
3.2.4 Designing reinsurance contracts 
In dealing with tail risks, mutual insurers often purchase “excess of loss” reinsurance 
contracts, in which the mutual is responsible for risks up to a specific level, the “attachment 
point”, above which the reinsurer is responsible for risks until some agreed upon limit. The 
remainder of the risk above the limit is assumed by the mutual. In some cases, a reinsurer may 
cover the majority, but not all, of the risk between the attachment point and limit, leaving the 
buyer of the reinsurance (in this case, the mutual) responsible for some portion of losses in this 
“layer”.  This is typically insisted on by the reinsurer as a means of combatting moral hazard 
concerns, and assuring that the party taking out the reinsurance is incentivized to take reasonable 
measures to prevent losses. However, because the reinsurance contracts considered here are 
index-based, moral hazard concerns are minimal (NAIC 2018), and the contract is designed such 
that all losses between the attachment point and the limit are covered by the reinsurer. 
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Reinsurance contracts are evaluated across a range of attachment points and limits, with 
171 different reinsurance contract layers assessed to identify tradeoffs across these combinations. 
Attachment points range from $30M to $200M (in $10M increments) while limits range from 
$40M to $212M (in $10M increments up to $200M and then jumping to $212M). All 
combinations of attachment point and limit are assessed across different layer sizes, ranging from 
$10M layers (e.g. $60M attachment point and $70M limit) to $182M layers ($30M attachment 
point and $212M limit). All reinsurance contracts are assessed with respect to the net cost of risk 
management, which will be defined in the next section.   
 
3.2.5 Pricing reinsurance contracts     
Reinsurance contract prices can be more difficult to estimate given a relative dearth of 
historical data, creating greater uncertainty in modeling these higher risk events (Qiu et al. 2012). 
Since there are fewer data and greater variability in the distribution of the risks managed via 
reinsurance relative to most insurance contracts, loading values for reinsurance tend to be higher 
(Froot 2001; Cummins et al. 2008). While theoretical models are frequently used to price 
insurance (Hardy 2006), reinsurance is often subject to less generalizable pricing approaches that 
involve a mix of both rigorous actuarial analysis and negotiations between the counterparties (Fu 
and Khury 2010; Lane and Mahul 2008).  
This work focuses on an increasingly common type of reinsurance, insurance linked 
securities (ILS), in which the reinsured risk is fully securitized by an investor (McKinsey 2013; 
Chang et al. 2014). This securitization indicates that the value of the reinsurance is held in a 
liquid form and available immediately when needed, an important consideration for a mutual. 
The specific ILS of interest in this work are collateralized reinsurance contracts, which are 
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structured similarly to publicly traded catastrophe bonds (another type of ILS), but privately 
arranged. Because catastrophe bonds are publicly traded, their pricing history is available 
(Artemis Deal Directory 2018), and these data have been used to develop empirical pricing 
models. These models have shown that important components in determining catastrophe bond 
prices include, primarily, the expected covered losses, but other factors such as peril type (e.g., 
wind, flooding), peril territory, market cycle, trigger type, and size can also be significant 
influences (Braun 2016; Galeotti et al. 2013; Chang et al. 2012, Gatumel and Guegan 2008; 
Dieckmann 2008). While there is agreement that all these characteristics have some effect on 
catastrophe bond prices, the magnitude of the effects varies. 
As there is no established method to price drought related reinsurance contracts, the best 
performing catastrophe bond pricing model (Braun 2016), from among five alternative models 
studied in the literature, is used in this work.  This model, which Braun developed based on 
catastrophe bond price data from 1997-2012, is a multivariate linear econometric model, in 
which coefficients for six variables determined to significantly affect pricing were identified 
(expected loss, location, diversification of the sponsor’s portfolio, market conditions, credit 
rating, and the price of comparable investments):  




!d+ë = peak	territory	designation	(1	if	yes; 0	if	no)	
ìî = SwissRe	sponsored	deal	(1	if	yes; 0	if	no)	
~ñç, = Synthetic	rate	on	line	index	(Lane	Financial	LLC	index)	
òô = investment	grade	rating	(1	if	yes; 0	if	no)	
ööì!~ = BB	corporate	bond	spread	(in	percentage	points) 
 
The other five models assessed are functions of either solely expected loss, expected loss 
and conditional expected loss, or expected loss and the market price of risk. The Braun model 
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results in a lower out of sample root mean square error than the other models by at least 5.4% 
and at most 17.4% (Braun 2016). In the Braun model, the expected loss (EL) has the greatest 
impact on the reinsurance premium. Intuitively, catastrophe bonds with higher expected losses, 
and thereby higher risk, will be more expensive. The second largest coefficient is associated with 
the peak territory (PEAK), a binary variable of 1 or 0, that reflects the higher level of catastrophe 
risk capital concentrated in the U.S. As these U.S.-based risks do not aid in geographically 
diversifying the portfolio of risks, and thereby contribute to greater correlation amongst 
geographically co-located risks, the peak territory designation is set to 1. The third term (SW) is 
another binary variable that relates to the diversification of the reinsurer, specifically SwissRe, 
which issues the majority of catastrophe bonds, and because of its high level of diversification 
tends to be in a position to offer lower reinsurance premiums. This work assumes that the 
reinsurer will be similarly well diversified and so the value of SW is set to 1. The rate on line 
index (ROLX) is a synthetic index compiled by Lane Financial Company which accounts for the 
changes in the market cycles for reinsurance. The average for this value over the historic period 
of catastrophe bond pricing for which the ROLX is available (1997-2012) is 0.95, which is used 
for this work. The investment grade rating (IG) allows for higher rated bonds to reflect lower risk 
through lower reinsurance premiums. As the majority of catastrophe bonds are rated BB (non-
investment grade), this value is set to 0. For the final term, the BB corporate bond spread relative 
to the spot Treasury curve (BBSPR), the average spread over the last 20 years is 3.5%, so this 
value is used. Therefore, when applying the Braun model across all possible reinsurance layers to 
this work, the final pricing model to determine the reinsurance premium is:  
 !àâ = 221.04dç + 304.97 (12) 
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When calculating the reinsurance contract premiums for attachment points from $30M to $200M 
and a limit of $212M, the premiums range from $0.5M to $26.5M and the loadings from 183% 
to 680% (Table 3).  
 
Table 3. Reinsurance contract prices and loadings for various attachment points and a limit of 
















30 1.93 9.37 26.50 183 
40 2.58 7.54 22.13 193 
50 3.22 6.1 18.62 205 
60 3.87 4.95 15.76 219 
70 4.51 4.01 13.38 233 
80 5.16 3.25 11.38 250 
90 5.80 2.64 9.70 268 
100 6.45 2.13 8.25 288 
110 7.09 1.71 7.01 311 
120 7.74 1.36 5.92 336 
130 8.38 1.07 4.96 364 
140 9.02 0.83 4.11 395 
150 9.67 0.63 3.36 431 
160 10.31 0.47 2.68 470 
170 10.96 0.34 2.06 514 
180 11.60 0.23 1.50 565 
190 12.25 0.14 0.99 621 
200 12.89 0.07 0.51 680 
 
These high loading values, which are in line with observed values, indicate the cost of insuring 
against low probability, high risk events, which account for the costs of maintaining high levels 
of capital. As this work is concerned only with parametric contracts, which represented 18% of 
catastrophe bonds from Braun’s analysis, the Braun pricing model is tested over this subset of 
data. For the 116 parametric contracts, model prices generated with the Braun model aligned 
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strongly with observed prices for parametric contracts, with a Pearson correlation of 0.84 (Figure 
17).  
 
Figure 17. Modeled catastrophe bond prices based on the Braun pricing model compared to 
historic actual prices 
 
The accuracy of the Braun pricing model on parametric contracts suggests it reasonably 
represents the pricing for reinsurance contracts for this PHDI index-based insurance. However, 
as this reinsurance contract pricing is not perfect, a sensitivity analysis on the modeled prices is 




































3.2.6 Determining risk exposure with reinsurance 
The mutual establishes the reserves required for its operations by issuing a 30-year bond 
in an amount that allows it to meet regulatory requirements. Without reinsurance, reserves are 
the only means of covering claims by mutual members and the bond will be in the amount of 
$212M, equal to the regulatory reserve requirement (99.5% VaR). In the case where reinsurance 
is employed, the bond size is commensurately reduced, depending on the level of reinsurance 
coverage, with the total combined coverage of reserves and reinsurance amounting to $212M of 
coverage (i.e. if a reinsurance contract covers losses between $150M and $212M, the bond used 
to establish reserves will be issued for $150M) (Table 3).  
Accounting for the variable levels of debt service and reinsurance loading costs, the total 
cost for the insured members can be represented as: 
 
¢b&	£$s& = *%&%"f	ç$"gchi + ~bchs%a"h{b	ç$"gchi + vb§&	ìba1c{b  (13) 
 
Each year, the mutual’s reserves may rise or fall, depending on the total payouts in a particular 
year. If no contracts are triggered and there are no payouts, the reserves increase by an amount 
equal to the premium received less the administrative costs. The reserves will also increase if 
lower than expected payouts are disbursed. A credit rating agency, A.M. Best, found that 75% of 
rated mutual insurers maintained capital in excess of 250% of the regulatory requirement in order 
to ensure long-run solvency (A.M. Best 2015; NAIC 2015; Laux and Muermann 2009; Gonulal 
S.O., 2012; Harrington and Niehaus 2002; Pain et al. 2016). Therefore, reserves up the 99.5% 
VaR regulatory level are maintained in a very liquid form and, in this work, earn only 0.53% 
(consistent with 6-month Treasury bills) (Federal Reserve Economic Data 2019), while any 
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reserves above this level are maintained in low risk investments, earning 4.35%, consistent with 
AAA-rated corporate bonds (Federal Reserve Economic Data 2019). These assumptions apply to 
reserves in scenarios involving reinsurance and those without.  
In order to account for fluctuations in reserves over time and determine how they impact 
Net Cost for mutual members, a 10-year time series is assessed. Each year, reserves must be at 
least as high as the 99.5% VaR ($212M), so additional capital or reinsurance coverage may be 
required after years with high payouts. If reserves fall below the 99.5% VaR, the mutual insuring 
with reinsurance purchases a new reinsurance contract, with an attachment point equal to the 
current level of reserves and a limit equal to the 99.5% VaR ($212M). The reinsurance contract 
that results in the lowest average Net Cost for any individual year (see Results in next section) is 
used as the reinsurance contract attachment point at the beginning of each 10-year period. 
Subsequent years will result in reinsurance contracts with different attachment points, and 
thereby different reinsurance loadings (which affect Net Cost), based on the level of reserves. In 
the case of the mutual insuring without reinsurance, more debt is issued in any year with a deficit 
relative to the 99.5% VaR at year end. This additional debt is issued in the same manner as the 
initial debt, over a 30-year time span and a coupon rate of 4.92%. The new amortized bond 
payment is then added to the Net Cost in each year until the debt service payments are fulfilled 
after 30 years.  
 
3.3 RESULTS 
The Net Cost for mutual members, as well as the mutual’s reserve levels (with and 
without reinsurance) are compared for 171 reinsurance contract structures. Across all of these 
contract structures, the reinsurance upper limit of $212M always resulted in the lowest average 
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Net Cost, as the loading nominally decreases across each higher layer due to the lower 
probability of payouts while the debt service cost stays the same. Therefore, the results section 
will focus only on the contracts with that limit. 
 
3.3.1 Average Net Cost for mutual members 
Before assessing the 54 scenarios, the components of Net Cost, including debt service 
and reinsurance loading, are examined to identify the tradeoffs between them. In general, rising 
debt service costs (i.e. larger reserves) correspond to higher reinsurance attachment points and 
lower reinsurance loading, while lower attachment points lead to reduced debt service costs and 
higher reinsurance loading (Figure 18). Reinsurance is the primary risk management tool when 
the contract has a low attachment point such as $30M, and the reinsurance loading in this case is 
quite high ($17.1M), and this allows for smaller reserves which lowers debt service costs to 
$1.9M. Debt service costs rise when larger reserves are paired with reinsurance contracts with 
high attachment points, even as reinsurance loading falls. All of these combinations of insurance 
and reinsurance offer coverage of losses up to at least the 99.5% VaR ($212M), but there is a 
tradeoff between debt service costs and reinsurance loading costs as the relative roles of reserves 
and reinsurance shift. The sensitivity analysis of the Braun pricing model describes differences in 
reinsurance loadings of up to $2.6M, and this disparity is largest for situations in which the 
reinsurance attachment point is very low, situations unlikely to be the most cost-effective (see 
next section).  
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Figure 18. Tradeoff between annual reinsurance loading and debt service costs for insuring with 
reinsurance at various attachment points compared to insuring without reinsurance. The lower 
and upper bounds (dashed lines) around reinsurance loading indicate +/- 10% sensitivity limits.  
 
When calculating a mutual member’s Net Cost (which includes the mutual’s loading, as 
well as reinsurance loading and debt service), the use of reinsurance with an attachment point 
above $75M resulted in lower Net Cost compared to sole reliance on reserves (no reinsurance) 
(Figure 19). The lowest average Net Cost across all reinsurance contracts is $17.4M, which is 
$1.4M lower than the Net Cost of insuring without reinsurance ($18.8M), resulting from insuring 
with a reinsurance contract with an attachment point of $130M. Employing reinsurance contracts 
with attachment points below $80M results in a higher Net Cost compared to using reserves 
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Figure 19. Net Cost (annual) for insuring with reinsurance at various attachment points 
compared to insuring without reinsurance. The lower and upper bounds (dashed lines) indicate 
+/- 10% sensitivity limits. 
 
When considering the sensitivity bounds of the analysis, a 10% increase in the 
reinsurance premiums results in a lowest average Net Cost of $17.8M, based on a reinsurance 
contract attaching at $140M. For this set of higher priced reinsurance contracts, attachments 
points above $95M result in lower average Net Cost when compared to insuring without 
reinsurance. For a 10% decrease in reinsurance premiums, a reinsurance contract attaching at 
$110M results in the lowest average Net Cost of $16.8M, with all contracts attaching above 
$55M resulting in lower average Net Cost compared to insuring without reinsurance.    
 
3.3.2 Total Net Cost for mutual members over ten years 
While considering the average of individual years is useful, using a longer time horizon 
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path dependent considerations, such as the rising and falling of reserve levels. A 10-year period 
is used as representative for planning purposes, and all analyses over this period involve starting 
the period with the least expensive scenario, which involves reinsurance with an attachment 
point of $130M. Over 10,000 trials of simulated 10-year periods, the average Net Cost is 
$212.3M when considering a baseline scenario involving no reinsurance, and $177.1M for the 
mutual operating with reinsurance, a 16.6% decrease (Figure 20).  
 
Figure 20. Net Cost across 10-years for insuring with and without reinsurance, beginning at a 



























A mutual operating without reinsurance may lead to the highest 1% of Net Cost over 10-
years of $383M as subsequent years of high payouts result in multiple new debt issuances to 
maintain sufficient reserves to meet the mutual’s 99.5% VaR ($212M) objective. For the mutual 
operating with reinsurance, the highest 1% of Net Cost over 10-years is only $282M, which is a 
26% reduction. While reinsurance contracts with low attachment points may be expensive when 
reserves drop to low levels, they are significantly less expensive than multiple years of additional 
debt service payments. 
Purchasing reinsurance contracts, as opposed to issuing new debt, as a means of 
maintaining protection at the 99.5% VaR level results in lower Net Cost, while operating without 
reinsurance leads to higher reserve buildups over the 10-year period. Average reserves at the end 
of the 10-year period are $175M and $316M, when insuring with and without reinsurance, 
respectively (Figure 21).  
 
Figure 21. Reserves after 10-years for insuring with and without reinsurance, beginning at a 

















































The higher reserve levels are an important consideration as they require incurring more 
debt, and outstanding debt at the end of each ten-year period can be substantial for the mutual 
insuring without reinsurance. As more debt is issued to increase reserves, this results in larger 
average reserve levels for the mutual insuring without reinsurance over 10 years, as reserves are 
always at least $212M. The debt service costs on these larger reserves are, of course, somewhat 
offset by the higher capital gains relative to a situation involving a mutual insuring without 
reinsurance. In order to account for both the outstanding debt, which would decrease reserves, 
and the projected capital gains on reserves, which would increase them, a new metric, Net 
Reserves, is computed for the mutual both without and with reinsurance and is presented as an 
aggregate 10-year amount. While the present value of outstanding debt is accounted for by 
discounting future debt service payments to the end of year 10, projected capital gains are 
dependent on fluctuating reserve levels over the 30 years. Therefore, historic average capital 
gains, which follow a linear growth pattern, are used as an appropriate metric for both the mutual 
with and without reinsurance, and used then to project average capital gains over the 30-year 
bond period and discounted to the present value (PV).  
 
¢b&	~bsba1bs = ~bsba1bs − !|(ñ%&s&"hgchi	vb§&) + !|(!a$rb{&	+1ba"ib	£"ec&"f	ô"chs)  (14) 
 
The average Net Reserves after 10-years are $214M and $197M, respectively, for insuring 
without and with reinsurance (Figure 22). While the Net Reserves are, on average, 8% higher for 
the mutual insuring without reinsurance, the mutual insuring with reinsurance has a lower 
probability of insolvency (i.e. reserves falling below zero) over the 10-year period, with only 
0.17% of the Net Reserves falling below zero, while insolvency occurs in 9.5% of the 10-year 
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simulations for the mutual insuring without reinsurance. Without reinsurance the mutual will 
often build up reserves to a higher level, in this case a maximum of $445M. In the case of the 
mutual insuring with reinsurance, reserves do not rise higher than $376M over the 10,000 
simulations run. However, these additional Projected Average Capital Gains are most likely 
outweighed by the significantly higher risk of insolvency when insuring without reinsurance.  
 
 
Figure 22. Net reserves after 10-years for insuring with and without reinsurance, beginning at a 
$130M attachment point when insuring with reinsurance 
 
3.4 DISCUSSION  
When considering the concept of a mutual for managing water utilities’ drought-related 
financial risks, using reinsurance to transfer tail risks can help reduce the Net Cost to members 
and reduce variation in Net Reserves over time. While water utility managers have not yet 
investigated the use of financial instruments widely, their development and use have been 
















































Alliance for Water Efficiency 2014).  There is also evidence that other public sector actors are 
beginning to consider reinsurance and other forms of financial risk transfer, as the Federal 
Emergency Management Agency recently purchased its first catastrophe bond in August 2018 to 
better manage risks for the National Flood Insurance Program. As the use of financial 
instruments continues to grow, understanding the degree to which reinsurance might play a role 
in managing financial risk related to hydrologic variability, within the water utility sector and 
beyond, may have increasing value.  
In this work, a mutual serves a large number of member utilities with mostly uncorrelated 
risks, so pooling of these risks has some advantages in terms of reducing the highest potential 
losses in any given year. It should be noted, however, that if mutual members were heavily 
concentrated in a specific geographic region, say Southern California, the correlation between 
the financial risks of the members could dilute the value of risk pooling and give rise to concerns 
over even larger payouts in drought years. Under such circumstances, more tail risk would likely 
be shifted via reinsurance, making it even more valuable in terms of reducing members’ Net 
Cost. In this case, the cost reducing potential of reinsurance would, of course, be offset by the 
higher premiums resulting from a more highly correlated pool of risks.  
With respect to other areas that would have improved this analysis, additional data from 
water utilities on factors affecting their financial risk from drought, such as pricing schedule and 
supply-to-demand ratio, would likely reduce the basis risk of index-based contracts and improve 
their effectiveness. In this work, the financial exposure of 372 geographically dispersed water 
utilities spread across 78 U.S. climate divisions were extrapolated to analyze the financial risk 
exposure of an even greater spread of water utilities across all 344 U.S. climate divisions. Data 
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from additional water utilities and information regarding specific characteristics of each water 
utility would further help to improve results.  
The Braun reinsurance pricing model indicates a high level of accuracy for pricing index-
based reinsurance contracts, and varying prices across a sensitivity range suggest that 
reinsurance is likely to reduce costs under many circumstances. It is also worth noting that 
traditional reinsurance prices were driven down by competition from newly developed 
catastrophe bonds, and continued growth will likely drive prices even lower in the future (Chang 
et al. 2014). Should this occur, reinsurance is likely to appear even more beneficial than it does 
in this analysis.  
 
3.5 CONCLUSION 
With predicted increases in the frequency and severity of extreme weather events, it will 
be important to continue searching for improved solutions to manage the financial risks of 
drought. Water utilities, in particular, should be cognizant of a range of tools and strategies 
available to them as part of their risk management practices, especially given that the financial 
consequences of drought are being more carefully scrutinized by credit rating agencies, 
increasing the threat of higher interest rates on debt (Chapman and Breeding, 2016). Reducing 
these risks in a cost effective manner requires identifying new risk management strategies that 
will become increasingly important in the future. Water utility personnel, financial institutions, 
and urban planners, all of whom will need to consider the risk of financial losses from drought, 
may find useful insights in this work, as may those that create and rate the debt vehicles that fund 
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CHAPTER 4: USING TREE-BASED MODELS TO REDUCE BASIS RISK IN INDEX-
INSURANCE CONTRACTS DESIGNED TO MANAGE FINANCIAL RISKS RELATED 




Weather is one of the most common causes of revenue deficits for water utilities in the 
United States (Chapman, 2012; Schmidt and Lewis, 2017; Tiger et al., 2014). Both abnormally 
dry weather, which can trigger conservation measures, and abnormally wet weather, which can 
reduce outdoor water demand, often result in reduced water consumption and lower than 
expected water sales (Donnelly and Christian-Smith, 2013; Eskaf and Leurig, 2014; Hughes et 
al., 2014). Water utilities typically budget using a straightforward cost recovery model, in which 
revenues are set roughly equal to costs. The majority of these revenues are typically linked to 
water consumption (e.g., $ per m3 or $ per 1,000 gallons) and therefore vary with usage, while 
most costs are fixed (e.g., debt service), so a reduction in water sales often leads to a budget 
deficit (Olmstead and Stavins, 2009; Spang et al., 2015; Tiger et al., 2014). These budget deficits 
are all the more disruptive due to their intermittency, with the timing and severity of the most 
consequential deficits being very difficult to predict. Any deficit reflects poorly in metrics used 
to determine a water utility’s financial health, and this can lead to a number of financially 
damaging outcomes, including a credit rating downgrade that leads to increased costs of 
borrowing (Leurig, 2012; Polasek, 2014). Downgrades can be very expensive for the capital 
intensive water utility sector whose debt service payments can be as high as 50% of total costs, 
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making any increase in interest rates potentially devastating (Chapman, 2017; Donnelly and 
Christian-Smith, 2013; Hughes et al., 2014; Polasek, 2014).  
While budget deficits linked to weather are not new, recent years have seen an increase in 
the use of conservation measures and supply transfers to combat drought, as the ability to 
develop large volumes of rarely used supply capacity, which has traditionally offered security 
against drought, has been curtailed (Brajer et al., 1989; Beecher and Chesnutt, 2012). Both 
greater reliance on conservation measures and water transfers have exacerbated drought-related 
financial risk from drought events while cooler and wetter than normal summers result in 
reduced water sales and similarly greater financial risks for water utilities. Utilities experiencing 
either abnormal dryness or wetness without financially sound solutions has motivated credit 
ratings agencies to institute new evaluation criteria related to hydrologic variability which is now 
being applied to all “water agencies,” a label that includes not only water utilities but also 
irrigation districts and other weather-dependent organizations (Chapman and Breeding, 2016).  
Water utilities have a traditional set of financial tools that they employ to reduce this risk, 
including cash reserves and drought pricing, but these can often have disadvantages (e.g., 
opportunity costs of capital, equity considerations for low income households) when it comes to 
managing the more severe events. Index-based financial insurance contracts have been explored 
as another tool for managing drought-related financial risk, with these involving utilities 
receiving a payout when weather conditions correlated with low revenue periods (as measured 
by the index) prevail (Baum et al., 2018; Brown and Carriquiry, 2007; Zeff and Characklis, 
2013). Index-based contracts typically reduce transaction costs, as the losses experienced during 
any event do not need to be assessed, while also benefitting from greater transparency, 
presuming the choice of a publicly available index (e.g. precipitation, temperature), as well as 
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facilitating more rapid resolution of claims. A key ingredient is an effective index, one that 
correlates well with financial losses. If these are poorly correlated, then insurance payouts may 
differ significantly from the losses, giving rise to concern over “basis risk,” a term used to 
describe any lack of correlation. Figure 23 illustrates the difference between a low and high basis 
risk index, and while most index-based contracts exhibit some basis risk, reducing this is an 
important consideration in contract development. The level of basis risk varies considerably 
across the range of commercially traded weather-based index contracts, with R2 values ranging 
from 0.2 to 0.9 (Manfredo and Richards, 2009; Norton et al., 2010). And, although a contract 
exhibiting high basis risk can still be a useful risk management tool, there is little dispute that 
lowering basis risk improves the effectiveness of an index contract, while also offering the 
potential for reducing its price (Elabed et al., 2013).  
 
Figure 23. Index-based insurance contract with low basis risk (left) versus an index-based 
insurance contract with higher basis risk (right) 
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index/conditions are measured and the location where the losses are experienced (Biffis and 
Chavez, 2017; Chen and Roberts, 2004; Clement et al., 2018; Elabed et al., 2013; Jensen and 
Barrett, 2017; Muneepeerakul et al., 2017; Norton et al., 2015; Ritter et al., 2014; Štulec, 2017; 
Woodard and Garcia, 2008). For a surface water utility dependent on streamflow, spatial basis 
risk may arise because the streamflow gauge is distant from the water utility’s supply. Temporal 
basis risk measures the extent to which the timing of index measurement fails to coincide with 
the period during which losses occur (Clement et al., 2018; Dalhaus et al., 2018; Jensen and 
Barrett, 2017; Shi and Jiang, 2016). Production-related basis risk arises due to the 
ineffectiveness of specific index and threshold values chosen for the contract design 
(Muneepeerakul et al., 2017). While a variable, such as precipitation, may seem like a 
straightforward index, with a specific threshold to predict financial losses, these losses may not 
align with contract payouts due specifically to the contract design, causing production-related 
basis risk. Other indices and thresholds that may not have been considered may be better 
representations of financial losses.  
Evidence suggests that demand for weather-based index insurance increases as basis risk 
decreases (Biffis and Chavez, 2017; Clement et al., 2018; Elabed et al., 2013; Jensen et al., 
2016), so identifying more effective ways of identifying appropriate indices will be important for 
expanding the use of these instruments.  Studies focused on reducing individual aspects of basis 
risk for weather-based index insurance have been conducted, particularly in the agricultural 
sector. In order to reduce spatial basis risk, multiple spatial scales (e.g. district and local) (Elabed 
et al., 2013), a portfolio of weather stations (Norton et al., 2015; Ritter et al., 2014), and 
interpolation techniques at unmonitored locations (Paulson and Hart, 2006) have been used. 
Temporal basis risk reduction has been addressed through subdividing time periods based on 
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seasonal effects (Shi and Jiang, 2016; Biffis and Chavez, 2017) or measuring an index at 
different times in subsequent years to account for shifting annual patterns (Dalhaus et al., 2018). 
Production basis risk has been reduced by identifying better performing contract designs through 
investigation of new indices, which in the case of farm yields resulted in using rainfall intensity 
and frequency instead of cumulative rainfall (Muneepeerakul et al., 2017). While reducing 
individual aspects of basis risk has been studied, addressing multiple aspects of basis risk for 
weather-based index insurance has been largely unexplored. Biffis and Chavez (2017) 
investigated both precipitation and temperature indices across various temporal scales in an 
effort to reduce temporal and production-related basis risk. However, reducing all three aspects 
of basis risk for improved design of weather-based index insurance has not been explored.  
As larger amounts of data have become available in recent years, developing index-based 
insurance with multiple indices across various spatial and temporal scales has become more 
practical, with the potential to lead to reduced basis risk. While these assessments have not been 
used for weather-based index insurance, models for predicting crop yields (Jeong et al., 2016) 
and streamflow (Carlisle et al., 2009) have been developed using tree-based algorithms that 
identify multiple indices across various spatial and temporal scales that have outperformed 
models based on multivariate linear regression. Tree-based models have also been used in 
financial contexts for various applications such as in developing quantitative trading strategies 
(Krauss et al., 2017), forecasting stock market crises (Chatzis et al., 2018), and developing 
investment strategies (Lee et al., 2019). Combining the use of tree-based models with weather-
based index insurance contracts has not been explored in the literature and will be the focus of 
this work.  
 100 
For specific hydrologic-based index insurance designed to mitigate hydrologic-related 
financial losses, index insurance has received some attention in the literature, often with indices 
carefully tailored to an individual circumstance, thereby leading to low basis risk (Zeff and 
Characklis, 2013; Meyer et al., 2015; Brown and Carriquiry, 2007; Foster et al., 2015). These 
financial contracts exhibited high Pearson correlations between contract payouts and revenue 
losses of up to 0.96 (i.e. very low basis risk). However, creating a custom index for every utility 
would be expensive and time consuming, and while this might be cost effective for very large 
utilities, it would be impractical for many. Index-based contracts for a pool of water utilities 
based around a broadly measured univariate index (e.g., streamflow, precipitation) could be 
applied to hundreds of water utilities, however the basis risk associated with these contracts for 
any individual utility may be significantly higher. In the case of recent research on a 
geographically disperse set of U.S. water utilities, the Pearson correlation values varied between 
0.25 and 0.95 for indices based on streamflow, precipitation, and the Palmer Hydrolgoic Drought 
Index (PHDI) (Baum et al., 2018).  Nonetheless, analytical approaches for identifying more 
effective indices has received little attention in the water resources literature.  
The objective of this research is to improve the effectiveness of weather-based index 
insurance contracts by using tree-based models to identify multivariate index-based contracts 
using a range of candidate indices with various spatial and temporal scales to reduce contract 
basis risk. These candidate indices will be referred to as “predictors” throughout the analysis, as 
they will be assessed based on their ability to most accurately predict financial losses. Since the 
outcome of interest is a continuous variable (financial losses), regression-based models are 
developed from several tree-based algorithms: decision tree (DT), gradient boosted decision tree 
(GBDT), and random forest (RF). Index insurance contracts based on these models are compared 
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to one another as well as to a well explored univariate PHDI-based index insurance contract 
(Baum et al., 2018) to identify the potential for reduced basis risk. While many water utilities 
face financial losses as a result of hydrologic variability, each has its own unique characteristics 
that may result in certain predictors correlating more or less strongly with an individual utility’s 
financial losses, making a standardized linear contract less effective. In this case, a singular tree-
based model is developed for all utilities, but it draws on a broad range of widely available 
predictor databases to develop non-linear multivariate indices that capture more of the variability 
between utilities. In doing so, a singular model for determining multivariate index-based 
contracts can be used by hundreds of different utilities, thereby reducing the time and expense 
necessary to create a specialized index for each utility and driving down the basis risk of index 
insurance, making it both more effective and less expensive, and presumably making water 
utilities more likely to purchase them. These results should be of interest to water utilities and 
financial institutions, as well as others focused on mitigating weather-related financial risks.  
 
4.2 METHODS 
Both univariate and multivariate index insurance contracts are designed to reduce 
financial risk due to severe wetness or dryness.  This analysis is based on a unique dataset 
involving 325 publicly operated surface water utilities for which both hydrologic and financial 
data were available from 2002-2013 (Figure 24). The univariate contract design is based on 
previous work that identified the Palmer Hydrologic Drought Index (PHDI) as the most effective 
univariate index from amongst several candidates, in large part because it resulted in the highest 
correlation (lowest basis risk) with water utility revenues across the dataset of all utilities (Baum 
et al., 2018). The tree-based models are used to assess 726 different predictors to determine the 
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combination that can be used to design a model that leads to multivariate index-based contracts 
with the lowest basis risk (for full list of predictors, see Appendix 1).  
 
Figure 24. Locations for the 325 water utilities assessed in this study  
 
 
4.2.1 Measuring contract and model performance  
Financial risk for water utilities is predominantly a function of utility revenues, as the 
vast majority of costs are fixed, with a significant portion of these related to debt-service 
payments that do not vary regardless of the amount of water a utility sells (Hanemann, 1997; 
Hughes et al., 2014). Therefore, the measure of financial risk in this work is variability in utility 
revenues, with data available from Moody’s Water and Sewer Municipal Financial Ratio 
Analysis (Moody’s Analytics, 2017), but at only annual increments. In order to make deviations 
in annual revenues comparable across all sizes of utilities, these deviations are standardized 
(µ=0, s=1). Model output is similarly determined with standardized values so comparisons can 
be made across utilities; However, to assess the total risk associated with the pool of utilities 
from the insurer’s perspective, these values are converted back into raw values. Most utilities use 
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reserve funds and/or some form of drought pricing to manage small to moderate deviations in 
expected revenues (Hughes and Leurig, 2013), but the effectiveness of these tools is limited 
when it comes to more severe and prolonged drought due to both the opportunity costs of 
liquidity and social welfare concerns (e.g., low income households), respectively (Hughes et al., 
2014; Zeff et al., 2013). The index insurance contracts considered in this work have been shown 
to provide an effective complement to these existing tools, especially for managing losses 
resulting from more severe droughts (Zeff et al., 2014). As such, the index insurance contracts 
are designed to mitigate the losses associated with these more severe events, with payouts 
coming only above a standard normalized value of 0.5 (µ=0, s=1), as this is observed to 
represent a revenue deficit of 5% or greater (with 95% confidence). This level was determined in 
discussions with utility personnel (Zeff et al. 2014) and is consistent with the public-sector 
nature of water utilities that cannot easily change prices quickly or substantially without public 
concern. The performance of contracts developed from each model is assessed based on the 
difference between modeled losses and covered losses, with the lack of correlation between the 
two referred to as “basis risk”. Basis risk for each model will be measured by the root mean 
square error (RMSE), with additional measures of basis risk assessed via mean absolute error 
(MAE), and the Pearson correlation coefficient (R).  
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These measures of basis risk are also assessed across subsets of modeled values resulting in 
payouts that are either greater than the covered losses (i.e. overpayments), or less than the 
covered losses (i.e. underpayments) (Figure 25). Covered losses that are equal to modeled 
payouts (i.e. anticipated payments) will not affect basis risk.  
 
Figure 25. Illustrative figure demonstrating the categories of outputs (underpayment, 









































While overpayments more than compensate for covered losses, they also lead to higher 
premiums, and probably lower rates of insurance uptake. Both overpayments and underpayments 
contribute to greater costs for water utilities, however the intermittent budget deficit associated 
with underpayments (i.e. 5% or greater deficit in revenue) are likely to be more difficult to 
mitigate and therefore receive more attention in this analysis. 
 
4.2.2 Univariate index insurance contract design 
The univariate index-based contracts considered as representing baseline performance 
use PHDI as the index and are based on previous work which found PHDI to be more strongly 
correlated with water utility revenues than several other candidate indices, including 
precipitation and streamflow (Baum et al., 2018). Data related to precipitation, temperature, and 
soil moisture content are used to calculate PHDI values, measuring relative deviations in water 
availability (Palmer, 1965). These PHDI values are calculated for all 344 climate divisions in the 
lower 48 states at a monthly time step (NOAA, 2017). Monthly PHDI values are standardized on 
a scale from -12 to 12, with any values below -3 indicating severe drought and any values over 
+3 indicating severe wetness. These values yield comparable measures of relative 
dryness/wetness across all 344 U.S. climate divisions and are publicly available from NOAA 
(NOAA National Climate Data Center, 2017) from 1896-2018, which overlaps with the period 
over which utility revenue data are available (2002-2013).  
In earlier work, a linear payout contract structure was developed in which PHDI values 
below a “strike” (k1) of -3 begin to trigger payouts. Payouts increase as the severity of the 
drought increases (i.e. as PHDI becomes more negative) at a rate expressed in units of $/PHDI 
that corresponds to the relationship between revenue and low range (<-3) PHDI values identified 
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for each utility (m1, the slope of the payout function) (Figure 26). While drought events are often 
cited as a cause of revenue deficits, abnormally wet periods can also lead to deficits as many 
outdoor uses decline (Chapman and Breeding, 2016; Chesnutt, 2014; Eskaf and Leurig, 2014; 
Hughes et al., 2014; Hughes and Leurig, 2013; Polasek, 2014; Tiger et al., 2014). Revenue 
deficits from both abnormally dry and wet periods are assessed, so a secondary payout is 
designed for abnormally wet events, with a strike (k2) set at PHDI = +3. In this case, payouts 
increase as PHDI values rise at a rate corresponding to the relationship between high range (>+3) 
PHDI values and revenue for each utility (m2) (Note: this is not typically the same slope as for 
low PHDI levels (m1)) (Figure 26). With respect to dry weather periods (PHDI < -3), a subset of 
36% of the 372 utilities surveyed displayed higher correlation levels (R > 0.25) between PHDI 
and reduced revenues (Baum et al., 2018).  During wet periods (PHDI > +3), 39% of the 
surveyed utilities have Pearson correlation values less than -0.25 between high PHDI values and 
revenues. 
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4.2.3 Multivariate tree-based model index insurance design 
Insurance contracts based on multivariate tree-based indices are created from three 
different tree-based algorithms (decision tree (DT), gradient boosted decision tree (GBDT), and 
random forest (RF)), each of which will be described in turn. In each case, a range of predictors 
related to hydrologic metrics are used to repeatedly split the data to determine the output of 
interest, water utility revenue deficits from expected revenue. In order to capture relationships 
between indices and a pool of water utilities with varying characteristics, a linear model is likely 
to prove inadequate, supporting the investigation of tree-based algorithms with non-linear 
solution spaces. These models are likely to lead to more complex, multivariate index-based 
contracts that could reduce basis risk, but may also result in less intuitive contracts, which could 
impact the appeal to water utilities. The sequence of steps to develop the tree-based models for 
each algorithm is the same (Figure 27). 
 
Figure 27. Machine learning model development steps for each tree-based algorithm 
train test







Identification of 726 predictors of interest and associated 
output (revenue) (2,947 data points)
Data are split to train the model (80% (2,357 data points)) 
and later test the model (20% (590 data points))
Training data (2,357 data points) are split into subsets of 
training (80%) and testing (20%) data across five folds 
such that each data point is part of a test set once in order 
to optimize model parameters across all subsets
The full set of training data (2,357 data points) is used to 
create a model using the optimal parameters discovered
The newly created model is tested on the initial test set 
of data (590 points) to assess model performance
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These steps are: identifying predictors of interest, splitting the data into subsets on which 
to train and test the model, a combined grid search and 5-fold cross validation of the training 
dataset to determine the optimal model parameters, creation of a tree-based model with the 
optimized parameters, and an assessment of model performance using the test set of data 
(Breiman et al., 1984; Hastie et al., 2009; James et al., 2013; Pedregosa et al., 2011). 
Unlike the univariate contracts, the final contract designs derived from the tree-based 
models do not involve strike values and slopes. Rather, the tree-based models define the structure 
of the contracts, based on following each branch of the tree with specific predictor (f) and 
threshold (t) values, with payouts determined directly from the end node/leaf (yi), below which 
there are no more branches (Figure 28).    
 
Figure 28. Generic decision tree design  
While this generic design is the basis for all the tree-based models, the GBDT and RF 
models are ensembles of trees, meaning the final models are based on aggregations of many 
decision trees, an approach that has been shown to improve model accuracy (Loh, 2014; 
Friedman, 2001). The GBDT design is an example of boosting, in which trees are created 
sequentially based on the residual errors of the preceding tree through functional gradient 
descent (Elith et al., 2008; Hastie et al., 2009; James et al., 2013). This means that each tree 
added to the model is built on the residuals of the previous tree and weighted by the “learning 
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rate”, a parameter defining the contribution of each tree to the final model. The learning rate is a 
value between 0 and 1, also known as “shrinkage”, by which each step of the gradient descent is 
reduced, such that the contribution of subsequent trees aids in minimizing the root mean square 
error of the model without overshooting. There is a balance between the learning rate and the 
total number of trees, with smaller learning rates generally resulting in better model outcomes 
(lower RMSE) when used with a larger number of trees, as more steps (i.e. trees) in gradient 
descent are needed to reach the same minimum (Friedman, 2001; James et al., 2013). RF differs 
from GBDT in that it uses bagging, a technique in which each decision tree is based on a subset 
of predictors and created independently (rather than successively), then averaged together (James 
et al., 2013; Louppe, 2015). The subset of predictors is chosen randomly for each tree in an effort 
to reduce overfitting, as it allows different and uncorrelated predictors to be combined in the 
final tree-based model (Hastie, 2009). Both of these ensemble models result in complex contract 
designs, making them somewhat less intuitive to a potential buyer than a simple univariate-based 
index contract, and the implications of this will be addressed in the Discussion. 
For all decision tree-based models, predictors are selected based on publicly available 
weather data related to hydrologic variability and which are captured at a monthly timestep 
(Table 4). These predictors are various measures of drought, precipitation, temperature, and 
streamflow, and raw measurements are standardized (µ=0, s=1) at each measurement location. 
The predictors were chosen to aid in reducing both spatial basis risk, through assessing regional 
and local predictors, and temporal basis risk, through assessing various time steps (e.g. seasonal, 
annual, etc.). For predictors assessed at a local level (i.e. nearest weather station), the five nearest 
stations were used in order to smooth any missing data from the nearest station. Table 4 shows 
eleven predictors, which each have 26 variations related to measurement (average, maximum, 
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minimum) and time scale (annual, water year, 3-month moving average, seasons). For example, 
for “Monthly PHDI”, the following are examples of unique variables included as predictors of 
interest for the model, for which a full set is available in Appendix 1: average of monthly PHDI 
from January through December, average of maximum monthly PHDI from January through 
December, minimum of monthly PHDI from January through December, average of monthly 
PHDI from October through September (water year), and maximum of monthly PHDI from 
October through September (water year). Each of the 26 variations for the eleven predictors are 
also determined at a 6-month and 1-year lag to account for potential variability among water 
utilities in areas such as storage capacity that might result in delays in financial consequences, 
driving the total number of predictors up to 726 (see Appendix 1 for the full list of predictors) 
These 726 predictors are assessed to determine the decision tree design, finding the best 
individual predictor (f) and threshold value (t) on which to split the data at each internal node 
until the end nodes (yi) are reached (Figure 28). Tree-based models are designed such that binary 
splits recursively partition the data until the parameter values that minimize basis risk are 
reached, resulting in a non-linear solution space (Breiman et al., 1984; Hastie et al., 2009; James 
et al., 2013). Each end node value (#á) is the average of all data points that fall within that node. 
Figure 28 shows an illustrative example of a regression decision tree with 14 splits (or branches), 
7 internal nodes, and 8 end nodes (or leaves). This example tree uses the 7 most important 






Table 4. Data and sources for predictors 
Predictor Spatial Scale Time Scale Source 
Monthly PHDI  
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
climate division annual (Jan-Dec),  
water year (Oct-Sept),  
3-month moving average, 




Total monthly precipitation 
(standardized)  
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Monthly maximum daily 
precipitation (standardized)    
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Number of days in a month with 
> 1 in. precipitation 
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Number of days in a month with 
> 0.01 in. precipitation 
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Monthly average daily 
temperature (standardized)  
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Monthly maximum daily 
temperature (standardized)  
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Monthly minimum daily 
temperature (standardized)  
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Number of days with temperature 
> 70°F in a month 
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Number of days with temperature 
> 90°F in a month 
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest weather 
station 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





Monthly average streamflow 
(standardized)  
   [average, maximum, minimum] 
nearest 
upstream gauge 
annual (J-D),  
water year (O-S),  
3-month moving average, 





In order to assess the effectiveness of the model, the entire dataset is split, with 80% of 
the data used to train the model and 20% set aside to test the final model (Hastie et al., 2009; 
Pedregosa et al., 2011). When creating a model, it is possible to over-fit to the training data, 
resulting in strong performance (low RMSE) for the training set, but poor performance (high 
RMSE) for the test set. This would indicate a weak model, as the purpose of the model is to be 
able to accurately predict the outcome of interest for any dataset. In this case, the model should 
be able to predict the revenue deficits experienced as a result of hydrologic variability for any 
water utility, which is tested using the subset of ‘test data’ that was not used during the training 
stage of the model.  
Parameter selection aids in reducing under- or over-fitting of the model, as it determines 
the characteristics of the trees. Parameters refer to the factors that are set before the model is 
trained, selected via an exhaustive grid search of parameter values of interest to determine 
optimal values for the model (Elith et al., 2008). All of the relevant parameters of interest for 
each tree-based algorithm are tuned in conjunction with 5-fold cross validation via 
GridSearchCV in Python, a technique by which the training data are split into subsets of all 
combinations of four “train” and one “test” sets, such that each data point is included in exactly 
one test set (Elith et al., 2008; Pedregosa et al., 2011). By averaging the results of these five 
folds, a better sense of the generalizability of the model to all data will be determined, once again 
aiding in reducing under- or over-fitting of the model (Hastie et al., 2009; James et al., 2013; 
Pedregosa et al., 2011). 
The following parameters are of interest for all three tree-based algorithms: tree depth, 
minimum number of samples at each split, minimum number of samples in each leaf, and the 
random state. Finding the optimal tree depth is critical to minimizing RMSE, as higher or lower 
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than optimal values can result in over-fitting or under-fitting, respectively (James et al., 2013). 
The maximum tree depth was tested across the values from 3-9.  These are common values 
resulting in high performing decision trees, as they provide sufficient depth to fit the model well 
without overfitting, depending on the dataset (Breiman et al., 1984; Hastie et al., 2009; 
Pedregosa et al., 2011). The minimum number of samples at each split and the minimum 
number of samples in each leaf (i.e. end node) must recognize generalizable patterns in outliers 
of the data. A smaller number of samples required at each split, and similarly, a smaller number 
of samples in each leaf, may result in a model biased toward particular outliers of the training 
data. However, a larger number of samples required at each split or in each leaf may group 
together different data points that could result in more accurate outcomes if separated into 
different splits or leaves. Therefore, the minimum number of samples at each split and the 
minimum number of samples in each leaf were tested across all values from 2-5 and 1-4, 
respectively. The random state is the random seed used to ensure reproducibility of the results 
and was set to 2,593 for all tree-based algorithms.         
The ensemble models (GBDT and RF) have additional parameters, including the total 
number of trees used in the ensemble (for both GBDT and RF) and the learning rate (for GBDT). 
As described previously, the number of trees relates to the learning rate for GBDT models, in 
that lower learning rates often demand more trees (James et al., 2013). In this work, the total 
number of trees were tested across a range of values from 100 to 300 in increments of 50, and the 
learning rate was tested from 0.01 to 0.1 in increments of 0.01. As RF models are not iterative, 
the learning rate is not a model parameter. The total number of trees is tested across the same 
range (100 to 300 by 50) for the RF models. Once the optimal parameters are determined for 
each tree-based algorithm, the models are developed according to those parameters.  
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The training dataset is used to determine the specific predictors (f) and thresholds (t) of 
the decision tree that minimize RMSE. These tree-based algorithms are “greedy” algorithms, in 
that the optimal predictors and thresholds are chosen at each branch split, regardless of the 
following branches in order to minimize RMSE (Equation 4) (Breiman et al., 1984; Loh, 2014). 
For example, the first split is selected by assessing all 726 predictors (f) across all possible 
threshold values (t) and determining which combination of feature and threshold (´) results in 
model payouts closest to the covered losses for all utilities (i.e. minimized RMSE). This splitting 
process continues until the pre-specified parameters are reached.   
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 As discussed previously, underpayments are more detrimental to utilities due to the 
unexpected revenue deficits implied, and thereby are most important to avoid. In order to create 
a model that reduces the number of underpayments, additional models for each of the three tree-
based models are generated in which the data points from the training set which result in 
underpayments are upsampled to increase the influence of these underpayments in the model 
equal to that of overpayments (Bagriacik et al., 2018; Krawczyk, 2016). Similar to how credit 
card companies train machine learning models to better detect fraud, which historically occur 
with much lower frequency than non-fraud data, the fraud outcomes are upsampled. This is done 
in order to ensure the model is not biased to non-fraud data so that the model can most accurately 
account for the less frequent outcomes. In this work, a larger dataset consisting of certain 
samples (in this case underpayments) are upsampled by considering their input multiple times 
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such that overpayments and underpayments are equally represented and thereby influence the 
model design equally (Torgo et al., 2014). In this case, each underpayment is upsampled by a 
factor of two in order to reach equal proportions of overpayments and underpayments.   
 
4.2.4 Contract pricing 
Once the modeled losses are determined, the distribution of aggregate annual payouts is 
assessed in order to determine the premium (i.e. price) to charge for each contract. The premium 
is the sum of the expected payout and an additional “loading” that accounts for the 
administrative and additional costs associated with maintaining higher levels of risk. While 
various pricing approaches exist, the Wang transform has been used to account for skewed 
distributions with greater tail risk (Wang, 2002), and has been applied in a number of previous 
investigations of environmental financial risk (references from our group and others). The Wang 
transform alters the distribution in order to more heavily weight low-probability, high-payout, 
events: 
 j∗(,) = Φ[Φm9>j(k)? − n]  (19) 
Where F(X) = cdf of payouts; Φ = standard normal cdf; n = market price of risk 
 
A market price of risk (n) of 0.25 is derived from the literature on weather derivatives (Wang, 
2002), as there is no current price information for the contracts being considered here. The 
premium, accounting for the risk adjusted distribution can be determined as follows:  
 
 !ab(c%( =	∑[k ∗ j∗(k)] (20) 
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This premium represents the cost of insuring all of the utilities in the risk pool, which can be 
allocated to each utility based on its respective proportion of the risk.   
 
4.3 RESULTS  
Once the optimal parameters were determined for each tree-based algorithm based on a 
grid search and 5-fold cross validation, the tree-based models were created using the full set of 
726 predictors of interest. The three tree-based models were developed using both the original 
dataset and a separate dataset with upsampled underpayments, resulting in six models overall. 
All models created with upsampled data resulted in lower RMSE by at least 26% when 
compared to models created with original data. As a result, models based on upsampled data will 
be the focus of results discussed here, as substantial gains in model accuracy as measured by 
reduced RMSE is a key objective of using more complex index-based contracts designed through 
tree-based models. Contracts assessed based on these three tree-based models all result in lower 
RMSE than the univariate PHDI-based contracts by at least 36%. Additional measures of 
contract performance include: mean absolute error (MAE), Pearson correlation coefficient (R), 
root mean square error of the subset of underpayments (RMSE-U), and mean absolute error of 
the subset of underpayments (MAE-U). Of the tree-based models, the RF model performed best, 
with the lowest RMSE, MAE, RMSE-U, MAE-U, and the highest correlation between modeled 
payouts and predicted losses. 
 Results from the validation exercise identify the optimal model parameters for each tree-
based algorithm (Table 5). Maximum depths of 6, 6, and 8 for the DT, GBDT, and RF models, 
respectively, indicate that all three models relied on a relatively high number of splits to more 
accurately predict values without overfitting. If the training data were overfit to a particular 
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model such that the test data resulted in high RMSE, a lower maximum tree depth would have 
been chosen that offers a less complex structure with fewer splits.  
 
Table 5. Optimal parameters for each tree-based algorithm 
 
Algorithm Parameters Test Parameters Optimal Parameters 
DT Max tree depth 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 6 
  Min. samples split 2, 3, 4, 5 2 
  Min. samples leaf 1, 2, 3, 4 1 
GBDT Number of trees 100, 150, 200, 250, 300 250 
 Learning rate 
.01, .02, .03, .04, .05, .06, 
.07, .08, .09, .1 
0.02 
  Max. tree depth 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 6 
 Min. samples split 2, 3, 4, 5 2 
 Min. samples leaf 1, 2, 3, 4 1 
RF  Number of trees 100, 150, 200, 250, 300 150 
  Max. tree depth 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 8 
  Min. samples split 2, 3, 4, 5 2 
 Min. samples leaf 1, 2, 3, 4 1 
 
In all three models, the minimum number of samples in each split was two and the minimum 
number of samples in each leaf was one, indicating that allowing leaves with just one data point 
aided in identifying singular values that are consistent across all of the cross-validated datasets. 
The GBDT model used 250 trees in its ensemble while the RF model used 150, indicating 
performance improved with an increase in the number of trees in the model. The GBDT model 
used more trees, as it was paired with a relatively small learning rate of 0.02, such that the 
influence of each subsequent tree in the ensemble slowly declines, resulting in a lower likelihood 
of underfitting or overfitting the data. 
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While ensemble models are difficult to visualize because they incorporate many different 
trees, an example branch of the basic decision tree design can be seen with each predictor and 
threshold value (Figure 29). With a depth of six, this tree resulted in 64 possible standardized 
payout values, determined by following the appropriate six branches of the tree. Due to the large 
size of the full decision tree, Figure 29 follows three initial branches and then shows the full 
remainder of possible branches. The first predictor on which the tree splits is the average of 
monthly PHDI from August to October, and if the value is less than or equal to 0.338 the model 
follows the left branch, if not, then the right.  
  
Figure 29. Decision tree results indicating predictors (f), threshold (t) values, and standard 
normalized payouts (µ=0, s=1).   
 
This first threshold value for the first node essentially splits the data into drier conditions 
to the left and wetter conditions to the right. The next possible splits are contingent on the 
average of monthly PHDI lagged by one year (January to December) and the average of monthly 
0
avg. monthly PHDI 
(Aug-Oct) 
≤ 0.338 






avg. minimum monthly PHDI
(Oct-Sept, 6-month lag)
≤ -5.005
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streamflow from November to January lagged by one year. The threshold of -2.408 for the 
average of monthly PHDI lagged by one year (January to December) splits the tree into very dry 
conditions to the left and less dry conditions to the right. For the right branch with a predictor of 
average of monthly streamflow from November to January of the previous year, the tree 
similarly splits drier conditions to the left and wetter conditions to the right. As the tree grows, 
the branches include more predictors, including temperature, precipitation, and streamflow 
measures which account for hydrologic conditions at various spatial and temporal scales, an 
important consideration for reducing basis risk.  
Similar figures are not available for the ensemble models, as they bring together the 
results of many different trees, however the relative importance rank of each predictor in the 
ensemble models is measured (Table 6). Relative importance of each predictor is based upon the 
total reduction in mean squared error due to that predictor, given all of the splits across all trees 
in the model (Elith et al., 2008). The most important predictor for the ensemble models is the 
average of total monthly precipitation in each water year (October-September), while the DT 
approach finds the average monthly PHDI (Aug-Oct) to be most important. For the GBDT 
model, the average of maximum monthly precipitation from April through March (water year 
lagged by 6 months) is the second most important predictor while the January-December average 
of maximum monthly temperature is the second most important predictor for the RF model. The 
five most important predictors for each of the models includes a measure of PHDI, Streamflow 
(SF), and precipitation, and both the DT and RF models also find temperature to be an important 
predictor (Table 6). This diversity indicates the value in using various predictors in order to 
accurately predict payouts. All three models share average monthly PHDI from August to 
October as one of the top 5 most important predictors. This is noteworthy, but not unexpected, as 
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this predictor identifies hydrologic conditions in late summer, following the primary outdoor 
usage period, which is often the time that surface water utilities start to face the greatest 
disruption (Chapman, 2012).  This can come from drought conditions that either lead to low 
supplies if consumption is unchecked, or revenues losses if conservation is mandated.  
Alternatively, when this period corresponds to wetter than average periods, the reduction in 
outdoor consumption can lead to large revenue deficits. 
Table 6. Importance ranks for each model 
 
 
The basis risk associated with each model can be visually described by comparing the 
modeled payouts to the covered losses (Figure 30). Underpayments, in which covered losses are 
greater than the modeled payouts, are shown below the 1:1 line and indicate that the utility is not 
receiving sufficient payouts to fully compensate for covered losses, while overpayments are 
above the 1:1 line, indicating that the modeled payouts were greater than the covered losses.  




































































    Figure 30. Comparison of results between the baseline univariate PHDI model and the tree-
based multivariate models 
 
Larger distances from the 1:1 line indicate greater basis risk, as measured by the RMSE. Data 
points on the horizontal axis indicate modeled payouts of zero with varying levels of covered 
losses. For the PHDI-based model, there are many more realizations along the horizontal axis in 
which covered losses were high while modeled payouts were zero, compared to the tree-based 
models. However, the PHDI-based model results in fewer points along the vertical axis, relative 




















































when, in fact, no losses were covered, which leads to higher premiums than a more correlated 
index would establish.   
The PHDI baseline model results in a RMSE of $7.68M, which is at least 1.5 times larger 
than any of the tree-based models. All of the tree-based models represent a substantial 
improvement from these baseline results, with RMSE values of $4.93M (DT), $3.42M (GBDT), 
and $3.26M (RF) (Table 7). The additional predictors and output values for the ensemble models 
result in more accurate predictions, and thus better agreement between payouts and covered 
losses for the GBDT and RF models. While none of the tree-based models result in zero error, 
the contracts developed from the tree-based models are not expected to be perfect. Rather, they 
represent a considerable improvement in RMSE from the univariate PHDI-based contracts and 
are the output of a standardized method that can be applied to thousands of utilities, which is 
significantly less expensive to develop compared to individualized contracts. The MAE values 
for each of the tree-based models are also substantially lower than the MAE of the baseline 
(PHDI) model ($1.64M), with MAE values of $1.27M (DT), $1.05M (GBDT), and $0.97M 
(RF). For the baseline model, 35% of realizations result in a situation in which losses are covered 
(i.e. revenue deficits which are greater than or equal to 5%). Of this subset of covered losses, 
84% result in underpayments. While the total number of underpayments is similar for each of the 
four models, the RMSE of the underpayments (RMSE-U) and the MAE of the underpayments 
(MAE-U) are substantially larger for the baseline model, indicating the improved accuracy of the 
tree-based models. The size of these underpayments results in poorer model performance when 
compared to the contracts derived from the tree-based models. A comparison of the metrics used 
to assess different aspects of basis risk can be seen in Table 7. 
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PHDI 7.68 1.64 0.61 30% 13.4 4.3 
DT 4.93 1.27 0.85 26% 8.9 2.7 
GBDT 3.42 1.05 0.95 26% 6.4 2.4 
RF 3.26 0.97 0.97 25% 5.9 2.1 
 
PHDI-based (baseline) contracts have substantially more basis risk than the tree-based 
models, however the PHDI-based contracts include all 372 utilities, many of which have a 
relatively low correlation between PHDI and revenues. Presumably, these utilities have either a 
high supply-to-demand ratio (e.g., perhaps they have recently developed a new supply), or have 
effective measures (e.g., reserves, drought pricing) in place to reduce their financial vulnerability 
to drought, and perhaps to a lesser extent, wetter periods. In order to separate out utilities that are 
more at risk of hydrology-related losses, and thus more likely to make use of index-insurance, 
PHDI is used as a proxy to identify a subset of utilities for which the Pearson correlation 
between dry conditions and revenue is greater than 0.5 or wet conditions and revenue is less than 
-0.5. This subset of 92 utilities serves as the basis for the remainder of this analysis.  
The basis risk of each model can be observed for the subset by assessing the difference 
between modeled payouts and covered losses (Figure 31). In all cases, restricting the dataset to 
these 92 utilities reduces underpayments in which covered losses are high while modeled 
payouts are zero. Figure 31 distinguishes between dry years (pink dots) and wet years (blue dots) 
in order to identify the differences in their contributions to financial risk. Dry and wet years are 
defined by negative and positive PHDI values, respectively. Dry years contribute to covered 
losses 1.7 times as frequently as wet years, resulting in at least twice as many modeled payouts 
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for dry years for each model. Dry years not only drive more years of covered losses and modeled 
payouts compared to wet years, but also result in significantly higher RMSE values.  
 
Figure 31. Performance comparison of contracts based on the baseline (PHDI) and tree-based 
models for the subset of 92 utilities exhibiting high correlation between revenues and PHDI 
 
 The RMSE for contracts based on the PHDI baseline model ($4.15M) is substantially 
higher than for those based on any of the tree-based models, in large part due to underpayments 
resulting in no modeled payouts despite significant covered losses. However, applying these 





































































RMSE values for all models. The tree-based models have a similar subset of dry-year 
realizations for which high levels of covered losses (>$4M) are not well compensated for by 
modeled payouts. These values contribute substantially to the RMSE of $1.11M (DT), $1.24M 
(GBDT), and $1.07M (RF). The RF model results in the lowest RMSE and MAE as well as the 
highest R value (Table 8).  
 











PHDI 4.15 1.12 0.86 19% 2.6 1.6 
DT 1.11 0.45 0.89 27% 2.0 1.2 
GBDT 1.24 0.45 0.89 28% 2.3 1.3 
RF 1.07 0.38 0.92 27% 2.0 1.1 
 
For each model, the difference between modeled payouts and covered losses are spread 
both above and below the 1:1 line, describing instances of both underpayment and overpayment. 
This picture may change, however, when considering all the utilities together as the aggregate 
payouts may result in values nearer to the aggregate covered losses in any year. As the utilities 
are pooled together, aggregate annual payouts are important for understanding how the pricing of 
contracts is affected by each model. The pricing of contracts is assessed through generating 
1,000 annual realizations based on synthetic hydrologic data via a process that maintains the 
covariance structure between all predictors at each utility location. The covariance structure is 
maintained through assigning random deviates to the expected value of each predictor through 
singular value decomposition of the covariance matrix between observed predictors (Onorati et 
al., 2013). These data are used to determine the distribution of aggregate annual payouts across 
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all 92 utilities for each model, which are then compared to the historic distribution of covered 
losses (“anticipated” payout model) using observed data from 2002-2013 (Figure 32).     
 
 
Figure 32. Distribution of aggregate annual payouts based on synthetic scenarios involving 
contracts derived from the baseline and tree-based models, as well as annual payouts derived 
from historic data (2003-2013) 
 
Based on the 10 years of historic data, the expected annual aggregate payout is $278M 
across all utilities. All four of the models result in a distribution of annual payouts with a right 
tail with similar expected annual aggregate payouts of $267M, $297M, $287M, and $316M for 
the PHDI, DT, GBDT, and RF based models, respectively. These payout distributions reflect the 
differences in the modeled payouts seen in Figure 31, with the PHDI model resulting in the 
lowest expected annual aggregate payouts, due to the many years in which covered losses result 
in no modeled payouts, while the RF model results in the highest expected annual aggregate 
payouts, having fewer years in which covered losses are higher than modeled payouts. The tree-
based model contracts may overestimate the payouts, resulting in higher premiums, however 
erring on the side of overpayments is likely preferred over underpayments.   

















While the payout distributions from tree-based contracts do not have long tails like those 
estimated for the distribution of the PHDI-based contract, the same premium pricing principle is 
used to maintain consistency and comparability across premium loading values (Table 9). Since 
the expected payout is higher for the tree-based model, the premiums are similarly higher. 
However, the loading values are smaller for the tree-based models and the historic covered losses 
(i.e. “anticipated”). Similar to the way in which risk pooling led to reduced costs of financial risk 
mitigation relative to risk shifting (Baum et al., 2018), the lower variance in the distribution of 
payouts from the tree-based models also helps to reduce the costs of financial risk mitigation, 
relative to the expected payouts. The loading values of 15%, 14%, and 14%, for the DT, GBDT, 
and RF models, respectively, result in similar loadings when compared to that of the PHDI-based 
contracts (13%).  










PHDI 267 142 303 13% 
DT 297 175 341 15% 
GBDT 287 163 327 14% 
RF 316 179 361 14% 
 
4.3.1 Individual utility performance 
While the aggregate performance of each model results in similar distributions of 
payouts, the performance of individual utilities differs based on the effectiveness of the model 
when viewed at a finer resolution. In order to determine how each utility performs independent 
of the others, the RMSE for each utility is calculated. From each utility’s perspective, large 
unexpected losses can cause additional financial challenges, particularly at levels beyond an 
annual revenue deficit greater than 5%, so the RMSE is assessed for each utility rather than 
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MAE. The distribution of RMSE for utilities using any of the tree-based model contracts centers 
around much lower values compared to those using the baseline (PHDI) contracts, indicating that 
many more utilities receive payouts closer to covered losses (Figure 33).  
 
Figure 33. Distribution of root mean square error of payouts across utilities for contracts based 
on the three tree-based models and the baseline (PHDI) contracts 
 
The average RMSE measured across the 92 utilities in the financially vulnerable subset using the 
GBDT model is the lowest, at 0.29 (recall that payout values are standardized so as to be 
comparable across utilities). The average RMSE for utilities using the RF and DT models are 
0.32 and 0.3, respectively. With respect to the baseline contracts, the distribution of individual 
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Contracts developed using multivariate indices developed with tree-based models exhibit 
significantly lower basis risk when compared to contracts based on a univariate PHDI index. 
Tree-based contracts had lower basis risk when assessed collectively, from the perspective of a 
pool of utilities, as well as individually, based on the distribution of risk metrics across 
individual utilities. While premiums increase for the tree-based model-based contracts, this is 
due to more modeled payouts that more closely aligned with covered losses.     
The RF ensemble model-based contracts resulted in the lowest RMSE and MAE, and 
highest Pearson correlation values. However, RF-based contracts may be more difficult to 
understand and describe to potential buyers. While each model predictor is known, the specific 
design of the model is more difficult to explain than a basic decision tree model or a univariate 
index contract and may have limited appeal to a buyer. A utility manager may not need to know 
exactly how the model works, however s/he must be able to understand the model enough to 
trust its output. Implementing tree-based contracts may require additional implementation steps 
in explaining the benefits of harnessing the power of more data to provide significant decreases 
in financial risk despite greater design complexity.  
While this research assessed a similar set of utilities across all models in order to ensure 
comparability of results, certain utilities may find one model to be substantially better in 
mitigating financial losses due to hydrologic variability, as each utility has its own unique set of 
characteristics. These models were designed to provide a single methodological approach to 
develop multivariate index-based insurance products. By creating a singular model that can be 
applied to all utilities, the process of developing new index-based products can be significantly 
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streamlined. However, if given more data on each utility, the tree-based algorithms could be used 
to quickly develop indices around which to build financial contracts for individual utilities, 
recognizing that sufficient data are needed to both train and test the model.  
Each of these models depends on historic data, however as the climate changes and 
hydrologic conditions vary beyond the current range of observations, models will need to be 
updated to reflect these changes. As new information is learned about hydrologic conditions, the 
various predictors used in each tree-based model-based contract can change differently and at 
different time scales and still be captured by a multivariate index derived from a tree-based 
model. With changes in the model will also come changes in the pricing of the contracts, which 
will likely become more expensive as hydrologic variability increases.      
Overall, tree-based models effectively reduce basis risk, which is critical to increasing the 
uptake of index-based insurance contracts. However, the additional complexity of some tree-
based models may obfuscate the relationship between hydrologic conditions and financial 
outcomes, making it more difficult to explain the workings of the contract to potential buyers. 
While this additional complexity may be interpretable by some water utility managers, it may 
leave others hesitant to adopt these tools. Balancing reductions in contract basis risk with their 
interpretability will be key to encouraging adoption of improved risk management strategies that 
have the flexibility and effectiveness to provide robust solutions over time.      
 
4.5 CONCLUSION 
Tree-based model-based contracts show the potential to develop indices that serve as the 
basis for more effective contracts designed to mitigate hydrology-based losses.  This could apply 
to thousands of water utilities across the U.S. and contribute to the development of more efficient 
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scalable, pooled risk management solutions. Random forest models, in particular, appear to 
provide the most significant improvement in the performance of the index-based contracts, 
however the less intuitive nature of the indices could deter utilities from purchasing such 
contracts. As more relevant data become available from the water utility and financial industries, 
there will be an opportunity to make use of this data in developing innovative new contract 
structures. Tree-based models offer an approach to using these data via more complex methods 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK 
 
 
 Pooling the risks of drought-related financial losses across the U.S. could improve 
financial risk management for thousands of water utilities at a lower cost. As new sources have 
become more scarce and hydrologic conditions change, improved financial risk management is 
required to maintain the type of financial stability that brings high credit ratings and low cost 
borrowing for this capital intensive industry. This dissertation develops novel financial 
instruments and explores new strategies that can be applied at scale across many surface water 
utilities in the U.S., developing knowledge that should assist them in mitigating financial losses 
arising from hydrologic variability. This analysis demonstrates how pooling risks with index-
based insurance contracts can, despite some autocorrelation of hydrologic events across the U.S., 
substantially reduce the costs of risk management. Compared to risk shifting via one-off 
contracts, or sole reliance on reserve funds, risk pooling reduces the insurer’s (or mutual’s) 
required reserves, leading to lower opportunity costs of capital and thus lower contract prices.  
In addition to investigating risk pooling, this work reveals the degree to which 
reinsurance can be layered on top of risk pooling to transfer tail risks and further reduce the costs 
of financial risk management for water utilities. In this case, the risk pool is expanded to all 344 
climate divisions of the U.S., and the pooled financial risk experienced from drought conditions 
by surface water utilities across all climate divisions is characterized. Various layers of 
reinsurance are applied to transfer the “tail risk” associated with low probability high payout 
events occurring during severe droughts. This work finds that reduced costs of capital associated 
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with lowering reserve requirements through the use of reinsurance results in lower net costs to 
water utilities. Although reinsurance pricing can be opaque, the validation of an existing pricing 
model through acquisition of a unique dataset gives high confidence to the finding that 
reinsurance can, when combined with risk pooling, lower the costs of providing equivalent levels 
of financial protection to U.S. water utilities.   
 While the cost reductions from risk pooling and reinsurance may attract greater uptake of 
hydrologic-based index insurance contracts for water utilities across the U.S., the effectiveness 
of a contract for each individual utility will also be contingent on the contract providing payouts 
when needed. Higher levels of basis risk are more prevalent in contracts applied to a broad group 
of utilities, as a result of individual system idiosyncrasies. In order to develop index-based 
contracts with lower basis risk and expanded appeal, decision tree-based models are developed to 
create multivariate contracts that can provide payouts with greater accuracy. All tree-based 
models resulted in contracts with reduced basis risk compared to univariate PHDI-based 
contracts, with gradient boosted and random forest models resulting in the lowest basis risk. The 
tradeoff associated with improvements, however, is a lack of transparency in their design and 
greater difficulty in explaining the conditions resulting in a payout to prospective buyers. As the 
approach involves ensembles of decision trees, understanding the full scope of the models that 
provide the payouts is less intuitive than a more straightforward index-based contract that makes 
use of a single metric such as PHDI. The choice of contract design is ultimately up to each water 
utility manager, but providing financial risk management options that are more accurate in their 
ability to predict needed payouts, but less transparent, may be appealing to more sophisticated 
parties such as larger utilities or water-dependent industries.  
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 In the future, as more data become available from longer detailed record keeping by 
water utility managers, improved index-based insurance contracts can be developed. While this 
work assessed ten years of revenue data at an annual timestep, utilities may be able to provide 
more detailed data at shorter timesteps (e.g. monthly) and over longer time periods, both of 
which would aid in building more highly resolved models that can further improve the design of 
index-based insurance contracts. With an increasing amount of data becoming more easily 
accessible, more sophisticated solutions may result in greater predictive accuracy of financial 
payouts. However attention will need to be paid to the design complexity of models, as contracts 
based on overly complex models may render them less attractive to some at-risk parties. 
Balancing the generalizability of strategies to a very broad group of at-risk parties with the 
complexity of their design to maximize efficacy is an important consideration for future work. 
Solutions and products must be easily interpretable by end users if they are to be widely adopted 
and lead to significant improvements in financial risk management. 
 Another area of potential future investigation would be the design of optimal risk pools. 
Analyses that assess the build-up and design of risk pools will need to consider the financial risk 
of each prospective utility and how its addition to the pool affects the risk of other participants, 
as risks are not completely independent. While a geographically diverse set of utilities will have 
mostly uncorrelated risks, if pool members are heavily concentrated in one geographic region, 
adding pool members from geographically disparate locations would be more beneficial in 
reducing the costs to risk pool members. However, with tools like reinsurance, concentrated risks 
that may give rise to concerns over large payouts in any given year can be relieved through 
shifting more risk via reinsurance. Using flexible approaches, such as index-based insurance, to 
mitigate financial risks from hydrologic variability offers the possibility of re-assessing risk 
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pools, pricing, and risk layers shifted via reinsurance regularly, unlike relatively irreversible 
decisions on infrastructure. This will allow for any annual changes to be accounted for in 
updated assessments using the most recent historic data that can consider changing conditions. 
Future work that assesses how different future climate scenarios can affect risk pools and their 
pricing would be valuable additions to this work.  
. While the focus of this work is primarily on water utilities, the lessons and tools could be 
easily extended to many water dependent sectors. Designing an array of solutions with various 
users in mind can help to offer far reaching solutions to water utility personnel, financial 
insurers, and urban planners, all of whom will need to consider the risk of financial losses from 
hydrologic variability. As hydrologic variability increasingly threatens the financial stability of 
water utilities, and current solutions on their own are inadequate, new solutions are needed. By 
reducing the costs of capital associated with risk transfer through risk pooling and reinsurance, 
combined with using multivariate tree-based models to design more effective contracts, more 
utilities will have the ability to improve their financial risk management strategies. This work 
demonstrates the potential for more cost-effective, improved management of financial risk 
related to hydrologic variability. Not only are these solutions more cost-effective, but they are 
also more environmentally friendly, as they enable greater use of conservation (i.e. less reliance 
on infrastructure) and more efficient use of existing resources (i.e. transfers), as they eliminate 
fears over related budget shortfalls due to these actions. These cost-effective solutions that take 
advantage of the benefits of risk pooling through standardized methods resulting in contracts 
with low basis risk, as well as risk transfer through optimal reinsurance contracts, provide far-
reaching opportunities for potentially thousands of water utilities, as well as other users with 
hydrologic risks, to better mitigate financial losses from hydrologic variability in the future.  
 




PRCPavgAnnual Average of total monthly precipitation within a year (January - December) 
PRCPminAnnual Minimum of total monthlyprecipitation within a year (January - December) 
PRCPmaxAnnual Maximum of total monthlyprecipitation within a year (January - December) 
PRCPavgWaterYear Average of total monthly precipitation within a water year (October - September) 
PRCPminWaterYear Minimum of total monthlyprecipitation within a water year (October - September) 
PRCPmaxWaterYear Maximum of total monthlyprecipitation within a water year (October - September) 
PRCPavg3Jan 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (November - January) 
PRCPavg3Feb 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (December - February) 
PRCPavg3March 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (January - March) 
PRCPavg3April 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (February - April) 
PRCPavg3May 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (March - May) 
PRCPavg3June 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (April - June) 
PRCPavg3July 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (May - July) 
PRCPavg3August 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (June - August) 
PRCPavg3Sept 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (July - September) 
PRCPavg3Oct 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (August - October) 
PRCPavg3Nov 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (September - November) 
PRCPavg3Dec 3-month moving average of total monthly precipitation (October - December) 
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PRCPminWinter Minimum of total monthlyprecipitation during the winter (December - February) 
PRCPmaxWinter Maximum of total monthlyprecipitation during the winter (December - February) 
PRCPminSpring Minimum of total monthlyprecipitation during the spring (March - May) 
PRCPmaxSpring Maximum of total monthlyprecipitation during the spring (March - May) 
PRCPminSummer Minimum of total monthlyprecipitation during the summer (June - August) 
PRCPmaxSummer Maximum of total monthlyprecipitation during the summer (June - August) 
PRCPminFall Minimum of total monthlyprecipitation during the fall (September - November) 
PRCPmaxFall Maximum of total monthlyprecipitation during the fall (September - November) 
EMXPavgAnnual Average of the maximum daily precipitation each month within a year (January - December) 
EMXPminAnnual Minimum of the maximum daily precipitation each month within a year (January - December) 
EMXPmaxAnnual Maximum of the maximum daily precipitation each month within a year (January - December) 
EMXPavgWaterYear Average of the maximum daily precipitation each month within a water year (October - September) 
EMXPminWaterYear Minimum of the maximum daily precipitation each month within a water year (October - September) 
EMXPmaxWaterYear Maximum of the maximum daily precipitation each month within a water year (October - September) 
EMXPavg3Jan 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (November - January) 
EMXPavg3Feb 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (December - February) 
EMXPavg3March 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (January - March) 
EMXPavg3April 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (February - April) 
EMXPavg3May 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (March - May) 
EMXPavg3June 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (April - June) 
EMXPavg3July 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (May - July) 
EMXPavg3August 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (June - August) 
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EMXPavg3Sept 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (July - September) 
EMXPavg3Oct 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (August - October) 
EMXPavg3Nov 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (September - November) 
EMXPavg3Dec 3-month moving average of the maximum daily precipitation each month (October - December) 
EMXPminWinter Minimum of the maximum daily precipitation each month during the winter (December - February) 
EMXPmaxWinter Maximum of the maximum daily precipitation each month during the winter (December - February) 
EMXPminSpring Minimum of the maximum daily precipitation each month during the spring (March - May) 
EMXPmaxSpring Maximum of the maximum daily precipitation each month during the spring (March - May) 
EMXPminSummer Minimum of the maximum daily precipitation each month during the summer (June - August) 
EMXPmaxSummer Maximum of the maximum daily precipitation each month during the summer (June - August) 
EMXPminFall Minimum of the maximum daily precipitation each month during the fall (September - November) 
EMXPmaxFall Maximum of the maximum daily precipitation each month during the fall (September - November) 
DP01avgAnnual 
Average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation within a year (January - 
December) 
DP01minAnnual 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation within a year (January - 
December) 
DP01maxAnnual 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation within a year (January - 
December) 
DP01avgWaterYear 
Average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation within a water year (October - 
September) 
DP01minWaterYear 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation within a water year (October 
- September) 
DP01maxWaterYear 





3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (November - 
January) 
DP01avg3Feb 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (December - 
February) 
DP01avg3March 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (January - 
March) 
DP01avg3April 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (February - 
April) 
DP01avg3May 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (March - 
May) 
DP01avg3June 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (April - June) 
DP01avg3July 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (May - July) 
DP01avg3August 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (June - 
August) 
DP01avg3Sept 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (July - 
September) 
DP01avg3Oct 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (August - 
October) 
DP01avg3Nov 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (September - 
November) 
DP01avg3Dec 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation (October - 
December) 
DP01minWinter 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation during the winter (December 
- February) 
DP01maxWinter 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation during the winter (December 
- February) 
DP01minSpring 





Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation during the spring (March - 
May) 
DP01minSummer 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation during the summer (June - 
August) 
DP01maxSummer 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation during the summer (June - 
August) 
DP01minFall 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation during the fall (September - 
November) 
DP01maxFall 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 0.01 inch of precipitation during the fall (September - 
November) 
DP10avgAnnual 
Average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation within a year (January - 
December) 
DP10minAnnual 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation within a year (January - 
December) 
DP10maxAnnual 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation within a year (January - 
December) 
DP10avgWaterYear 
Average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation within a water year (October - 
September) 
DP10minWaterYear 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation within a water year (October - 
September) 
DP10maxWaterYear 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation within a water year (October - 
September) 
DP10avg3Jan 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (November - 
January) 
DP10avg3Feb 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (December - 
February) 
DP10avg3March 





3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (February - 
April) 
DP10avg3May 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (March - May) 
DP10avg3June 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (April - June) 
DP10avg3July 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (May - July) 
DP10avg3August 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (June - August) 
DP10avg3Sept 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (July - 
September) 
DP10avg3Oct 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (August - 
October) 
DP10avg3Nov 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (September - 
November) 
DP10avg3Dec 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation (October - 
December) 
DP10minWinter 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation during the winter (December - 
February) 
DP10maxWinter 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation during the winter (December - 
February) 
DP10minSpring Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation during the spring (March - May) 
DP10maxSpring 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation during the spring (March - 
May) 
DP10minSummer 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation during the summer (June - 
August) 
DP10maxSummer 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation during the summer (June - 
August) 
DP10minFall 





Maximum of the number of days each month with >= 1 inch of precipitation during the fall (September - 
November) 
TAVGavgAnnual Average of monthly temperature within a year (January - December) 
TAVGminAnnual Minimum of monthly temperature within a year (January - December) 
TAVGmaxAnnual Maximum of monthly temperature within a year (January - December) 
TAVGavgWaterYear 3-month moving average of monthly temperature within a water year (October - September) 
TAVGminWaterYear 3-month moving average of monthly temperature within a water year (October - September) 
TAVGmaxWaterYear 3-month moving average of monthly temperature within a water year (October - September) 
TAVGavg3Jan 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (November - January) 
TAVGavg3Feb 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (December - February) 
TAVGavg3March 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (January - March) 
TAVGavg3April 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (February - April) 
TAVGavg3May 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (March - May) 
TAVGavg3June 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (April - June) 
TAVGavg3July 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (May - July) 
TAVGavg3August 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (June - August) 
TAVGavg3Sept 3-month moving average of monthly temperature (July - September) 
TAVGavg3Oct Average of monthly temperature (August - October) 
TAVGavg3Nov Minimum of monthly temperature (September - November) 
TAVGavg3Dec Maximum of monthly temperature (October - December) 
TAVGminWinter Minimum of monthly temperature during the winter (December - February) 
TAVGmaxWinter Maximum of monthly temperature during the winter (December - February) 
TAVGminSpring Minimum of monthly temperature during the spring (March - May) 
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TAVGmaxSpring Maximum of monthly temperature during the spring (March - May) 
TAVGminSummer Minimum of monthly temperature during the summer (June - August) 
TAVGmaxSummer Maximum of monthly temperature during the summer (June - August) 
TAVGminFall Minimum of monthly temperature during the fall (September - November) 
TAVGmaxFall Maximum of monthly temperature during the fall (September - November) 
DX70avgAnnual Average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature within a year (January - December) 
DX70minAnnual Minimum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature within a year (January - December) 
DX70maxAnnual Maximum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature within a year (January - December) 
DX70avgWaterYear 
Average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature within a water year (October - 
September) 
DX70minWaterYear 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature within a water year (October - 
September) 
DX70maxWaterYear 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature within a water year (October - 
September) 
DX70avg3Jan 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (November - January) 
DX70avg3Feb 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (December - February) 
DX70avg3March 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (January - March) 
DX70avg3April 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (February - April) 
DX70avg3May 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (March - May) 
DX70avg3June 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (April - June) 
DX70avg3July 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (May - July) 
DX70avg3August 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (June - August) 
DX70avg3Sept 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (July - September) 
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DX70avg3Oct 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (August - October) 
DX70avg3Nov 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (September - 
November) 
DX70avg3Dec 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature (October - December) 
DX70minWinter 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature during the winter (December - 
February) 
DX70maxWinter 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature during the winter (December - 
February) 
DX70minSpring Minimum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature during the spring (March - May) 
DX70maxSpring Maximum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature during the spring (March - May) 
DX70minSummer Minimum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature during the summer (June - August) 
DX70maxSummer Maximum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature during the summer (June - August) 
DX70minFall 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature during the fall (September - 
November) 
DX70maxFall 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >=70°F temperature during the fall (September - 
November) 
DX90avgAnnual Average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature within a year (January - December) 
DX90minAnnual Minimum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature within a year (January - December) 
DX90maxAnnual Maximum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature within a year (January - December) 
DX90avgWaterYear 
Average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature within a water year (October - 
September) 
DX90minWaterYear 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature within a water year (October - 
September) 
DX90maxWaterYear 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature within a water year (October - 
September) 
DX90avg3Jan 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (November - January) 
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DX90avg3Feb 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (December - February) 
DX90avg3March 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (January - March) 
DX90avg3April 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (February - April) 
DX90avg3May 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (March - May) 
DX90avg3June 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (April - June) 
DX90avg3July 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (May - July) 
DX90avg3August 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (June - August) 
DX90avg3Sept 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (July - September) 
DX90avg3Oct 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (August - October) 
DX90avg3Nov 
3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (September - 
November) 
DX90avg3Dec 3-month moving average of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature (October - December) 
DX90minWinter 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature during the winter (December - 
February) 
DX90maxWinter 
Maximum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature during the winter (December - 
February) 
DX90minSpring Minimum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature during the spring (March - May) 
DX90maxSpring Maximum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature during the spring (March - May) 
DX90minSummer Minimum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature during the summer (June - August) 
DX90maxSummer Maximum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature during the summer (June - August) 
DX90minFall 
Minimum of the number of days each month with >=90°F temperature during the fall (September - 
November) 
DX90maxFall 




EMXTavgAnnual Average of the maximum daily temperature within a year (January - December) 
EMXTminAnnual Minimum of the maximum daily temperature within a year (January - December) 
EMXTmaxAnnual Maximum of the maximum daily temperature within a year (January - December) 
EMXTavgWaterYear Average of the maximum daily temperature within a water year (October - September) 
EMXTminWaterYear Minimum of the maximum daily temperature within a water year (October - September) 
EMXTmaxWaterYear Maximum of the maximum daily temperature within a water year (October - September) 
EMXTavg3Jan 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (November - January) 
EMXTavg3Feb 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (December - February) 
EMXTavg3March 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (January - March) 
EMXTavg3April 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (February - April) 
EMXTavg3May 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (March - May) 
EMXTavg3June 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (April - June) 
EMXTavg3July 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (May - July) 
EMXTavg3August 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (June - August) 
EMXTavg3Sept 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (July - September) 
EMXTavg3Oct 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (August - October) 
EMXTavg3Nov 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (September - November) 
EMXTavg3Dec 3-month moving average of the maximum daily temperature (October - December) 
EMXTminWinter Minimum of the maximum daily temperature during the winter (December - February) 
EMXTmaxWinter Maximum of the maximum daily temperature during the winter (December - February) 
EMXTminSpring Minimum of the maximum daily temperature during the spring (March - May) 
EMXTmaxSpring Maximum of the maximum daily temperature during the spring (March - May) 
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EMXTminSummer Minimum of the maximum daily temperature during the summer (June - August) 
EMXTmaxSummer Maximum of the maximum daily temperature during the summer (June - August) 
EMXTminFall Minimum of the maximum daily temperature during the fall (September - November) 
EMXTmaxFall Maximum of the maximum daily temperature during the fall (September - November) 
EMNTavgAnnual Average of the minimum daily temperature within a year (January - December) 
EMNTminAnnual Minimum of the minimum daily temperature within a year (January - December) 
EMNTmaxAnnual Maximum of the minimum daily temperature within a year (January - December) 
EMNTavgWaterYear Average of the minimum daily temperature within a water year (October - September) 
EMNTminWaterYear Minimum of the minimum daily temperature within a water year (October - September) 
EMNTmaxWaterYear Maximum of the minimum daily temperature within a water year (October - September) 
EMNTavg3Jan 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (November - January) 
EMNTavg3Feb 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (December - February) 
EMNTavg3March 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (January - March) 
EMNTavg3April 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (February - April) 
EMNTavg3May 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (March - May) 
EMNTavg3June 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (April - June) 
EMNTavg3July 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (May - July) 
EMNTavg3August 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (June - August) 
EMNTavg3Sept 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (July - September) 
EMNTavg3Oct 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (August - October) 
EMNTavg3Nov 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (September - November) 
EMNTavg3Dec 3-month moving average of the minimum daily temperature (October - December) 
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EMNTminWinter Minimum of the minimum daily temperature during the winter (December - February) 
EMNTmaxWinter Maximum of the minimum daily temperature during the winter (December - February) 
EMNTminSpring Minimum of the minimum daily temperature during the spring (March - May) 
EMNTmaxSpring Maximum of the minimum daily temperature during the spring (March - May) 
EMNTminSummer Minimum of the minimum daily temperature during the summer (June - August) 
EMNTmaxSummer Maximum of the minimum daily temperature during the summer (June - August) 
EMNTminFall Minimum of the minimum daily temperature during the fall (September - November) 
EMNTmaxFall Maximum of the minimum daily temperature during the fall (September - November) 
PHDIavgAnnual Average of PHDI within a year (January - December) 
PHDIminAnnual Minimum of PHDI within a year (January - December) 
PHDImaxAnnual Maximum of PHDI within a year (January - December) 
PHDIavgWaterYear Average of PHDI within a water year (October - September) 
PHDIminWaterYear Minimum of PHDI within a water year (October - September) 
PHDImaxWaterYear Maximum of PHDI within a water year (October - September) 
PHDIavg3Jan 3-month moving average of PHDI (November - January) 
PHDIavg3Feb 3-month moving average of PHDI (December - February) 
PHDIavg3March 3-month moving average of PHDI (January - March) 
PHDIavg3April 3-month moving average of PHDI (February - April) 
PHDIavg3May 3-month moving average of PHDI (March - May) 
PHDIavg3June 3-month moving average of PHDI (April - June) 
PHDIavg3July 3-month moving average of PHDI (May - July) 
PHDIavg3August 3-month moving average of PHDI (June - August) 
153 
 
PHDIavg3Sept 3-month moving average of PHDI (July - September) 
PHDIavg3Oct 3-month moving average of PHDI (August - October) 
PHDIavg3Nov 3-month moving average of PHDI (September - November) 
PHDIavg3Dec 3-month moving average of PHDI (October - December) 
PHDIminWinter Minimum of PHDI during the winter (December - February) 
PHDImaxWinter Maximum of PHDI during the winter (December - February) 
PHDIminSpring Minimum of PHDI during the spring (March - May) 
PHDImaxSpring Maximum of PHDI during the spring (March - May) 
PHDIminSummer Minimum of PHDI during the summer (June - August) 
PHDImaxSummer Maximum of PHDI during the summer (June - August) 
PHDIminFall Minimum of PHDI during the fall (September - November) 
PHDImaxFall Maximum of PHDI during the fall (September - November) 
SFavgAnnual Average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  within a year (January - December) 
SFminAnnual Minimum of daily mean of streamflow discharge  within a year (January - December) 
SFmaxAnnual Maximum of daily mean ofstreamflow discharge  within a year (January - December) 
SFavgWaterYear Average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  within a water year (October - September) 
SFminWaterYear Minimum of daily mean of streamflow discharge  within a water year (October - September) 
SFmaxWaterYear Maximum of daily mean ofstreamflow discharge  within a water year (October - September) 
SFavg3Jan 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (November - January) 
SFavg3Feb 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (December - February) 
SFavg3March 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (January - March) 
SFavg3April 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (February - April) 
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SFavg3May 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (March - May) 
SFavg3June 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (April - June) 
SFavg3July 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (May - July) 
SFavg3August 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (June - August) 
SFavg3Sept 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (July - September) 
SFavg3Oct 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (August - October) 
SFavg3Nov 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (September - November) 
SFavg3Dec 3-month moving average of daily mean of streamflow discharge  (October - December) 
SFminWinter Minimum of daily mean of streamflow discharge  during the winter (December - February) 
SFmaxWinter Maximum of daily mean ofstreamflow discharge  during the winter (December - February) 
SFminSpring Minimum of daily mean of streamflow discharge  during the spring (March - May) 
SFmaxSpring Maximum of daily mean ofstreamflow discharge  during the spring (March - May) 
SFminSummer Minimum of daily mean of streamflow discharge  during the summer (June - August) 
SFmaxSummer Maximum of daily mean ofstreamflow discharge  during the summer (June - August) 
SFminFall Minimum of daily mean of streamflow discharge  during the fall (September - November) 
SFmaxFall Maximum of daily mean ofstreamflow discharge  during the fall (September - November) 
 
*Each of these 286 defined input variables is also lagged by 6 months (6ml) and 12 months (12ml) (except for rolling averages from 
June through December, as these would result in duplicates) resulting in a total of 726 predictors  
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